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SENATE GRIDLOCK AND FEDERAL 
JUDICIAL SELECTION 
Carl Tobias* 
One crucial locus of gridlock is appointments to the United States 
Courts of Appeals, which have grown extremely contentious, as the circuits 
resolve disputes about controversial issues and can effectively be tribunals of 
last resort for designated areas. Continuous Republican and Democratic 
charges, recriminations, and divisiveness have roiled the process for decades. 
The bench constitutes 179 judgeships; however, seventeen remained vacant 
at President Barack Obama's second inauguration notwithstanding his 
pledge to end the "confirmation wars" by assiduously consulting senators. 
Laboring without ten percent of the appellate court members subverts 
prompt, inexpensive and fair case disposition and undermines citizen respect 
for selection and the government. These propositions demonstrate that 
upper chamber gridlock and circuit appointments merit review, which this 
piece undertakes. 
Part One explores the conundrum. The assessment concludes that it 
derives from rampant partisanship and skyrocketing caseloads, which necessi-
tate more judicial positions; they enlarge the number of vacancies, which 
complicates selection. The paper next descriptively and critically recounts 
developments in Obama's tenure. Scrutiny reveals that appointees princi-
pally comprised very qualified ethnic minority and female jurists who aver-
aged fifty-five years of age upon nomination. Their confirmations improved 
diversity and signaled the realization of a career judiciary while marginally 
widening the experience and age range of the appeals courts. Determining 
that Obama has proffered sufficient, highly competent individuals, whom the 
Senate Judiciary Committee has robustly approved, to facilitate processing, 
but that the chamber has neglected to expeditiously vote on many, this Arti-
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de canvasses promising ideas that will enhance selection and counter 
gridlock. 
I. THE HISTORY OF THE JUDICIAL SELECTION DIFFICULTY 
A. Introduction 
The history of the appointments predicament requires limited consider-
ation in this Article because the concern's origins and development have 
experienced comprehensive investigation elsewhere1 and the contemporary 
situation is most relevant. The problem actually comprises two aspects. One 
salient element has been the persistent vacancies dilemma, which resulted 
from expanding federal court jurisdiction and soaring dockets initially mani-
fested throughout the 1960s. These enlarged the regional circuit and district 
court judgeships, radically increasing the quantity and frequency of open 
posts while slowing confirmations. Another essential dimension of the mod-
ern vacancy conundrum is political and can be ascribed to conflicting Repub-
lican and Democratic control of the White House and Senate that 
commenced about a quarter century ago.2 
B. The Persistent Vacancies Problem 
Congress enhanced federal jurisdiction around the 1960s. 3 It criminal-
ized much behavior and recognized numerous federal civil actions, develop-
ments that have contributed to accelerated cases and concomitant 
burgeoning appeals.4 Congress mainly addressed the rises by expanding 
1 Gordon Bermant et al., Judicial Vacancies: An Examination of the Problem and Possible 
Solutions, 14 Miss. C. L. REv. 319 (1994); MILLER CTR. CoMM'N oN THE SELECTION oF FED. 
JUDGES, IMPROVING THE PROCESS FOR APPOINTING FEDERAL JUDGES (1996) [hereinafter 
MILLER REPORT]. I rely in this piece on these sources and Carl Tobias, Federal judicial Selec-
tion in a Time of Divided Government, 47 EMORY LJ. 527 (1998). 
2 I stress this dimension. The persistent idea needs less treatment; some delay is 
intrinsic, resists easy solution, and has been assessed. Bermant et al., supra note 1; Comm. 
on Fed. Courts, Remedying the Permanent Vacancy Problem in the Federal judiciary: The Problem of 
judicial Vacancies and Its Causes, 42 REc. Ass'N B. CITY N.Y. 374 (1987) [hereinafter N.Y. CITY 
BAR]; see SARAH BINDER & FoRREST MALTZMAN, ADVICE & DISSENT: THE STRUGGLE TO SHAPE 
THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 2-6 (2009). 
3 See MILLER REPORT, supra note 1, at 3; see also Carl W. Tobias, The New Certiorari and 
a National Study of the Appeals Courts, 81 CORNELL L. REv. 1264, 1268-70 (1996). See generally 
Martha J. Dragich, Once a Century: Time for a Structural Overhaul of the Federal Courts, 1996 
Wrs. L. REv. 11, 23-24, 36-37, 39 (1996) (discussing expansion of federal courts). 
4 See, e.g., Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-
322, 108 Stat. 1796; Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 
327; see also William P. Marshall, Federalization: A Critical Overview, 44 DEPAUL L. REv. 719, 
719-21 (1995); Elliot E. Slotnick, Appellate judicial Selection During the Bush Administration: 
Business as Usual or a Nuclear Winter?, 48 ARiz. L. REv. 225, 238, 241 (2006);Jeffrey Toobin, 
Bench Press: Are Obama'sjudges Really Liberals?, NEW YORKER (Sept. 21, 2009), http://www. 
newyorker.com/reporting/2009/09/21/09092lfa_fact_toobin. 
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judgeships to the present complement: 179.5 A study of the decade and a 
half following 1980 concluded that appointment times rapidly 
mushroomed.6 Circuit nominations demanded one year and confirmations 
three months, and both perceptibly increased. 7 Conditions acutely worsened 
subsequently. For example, nominations consumed practically twenty 
months while appointments reached six months in 1997-the earliest year of 
President Bill Clinton's last term-and in 2001-the starting year of Presi-
dent George W. Bush's inaugural administration.8 The specific periods 
closely resemble Obama's term and merit systematic comparative analysis. 
The numerous and convoluted steps and number of participants in the 
contemporary nomination and confirmation processes mean that a certain 
amount of delay seems inevitable.9 Presidents and staff charged with respon-
sibility for picking appellate nominees traditionally consult home state 
elected officers, pursuing much support and constructive advice regarding 
putative choices. Nevertheless, administrations conventionally insist on 
assuming the substantive lead when mustering nominations for those vacan-
cies because the circuits, except D.C., include multiple jurisdictions and the 
courts' opinions encompass broader application than district judgments. 
Numerous officials concomitantly adopt commissions which may assist 
recruitment by canvassing possible nominees and swiftly proposing several 
capable applicants. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) performs 
thorough "background checks." The American Bar Association (ABA) evalu-
ates designees' core qualifications and rates the candidates, a useful service 
that it has provided since the mid-1950s. 10 The Department of Justice (DOJ), 
especially the Office of Legal Policy (OLP), might help screen aspirants, 
while DOJ prepares nominees for the Senate confirmation process. The Sen-
ate Judiciary Committee analyzes potential court members, stages hearings 
5 28 U.S.C. § 44 (2006); see also 155 CONG. REc. Sl653 (daily ed. Feb. 5, 2009); U.S. 
SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, judicial Nominations and Confirmations, SENATE Gov (Jun. 
27, 2013) http:/ /wwwjudiciary.senate.gov/nominations/judicial.cfm [hereinafter Vacan-
cies in the Federal Judiciary). 
6 SeeJuD. CoNF. OF THE UNITED STATES, LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL CouRTs 
103 (1995). 
7 Id. at 3. A Federal Judicial Center (FJC) evaluation found 1970-1992 vacancy rates 
twice as large in courts of appeals. Bermant et al., supra note 1, at 323; see also BINDER & 
MALTZMAN, supra note 2, at 5-6; David R. Stras & Ryan W. Scott, Navigating the New Politics 
of judicial Appointments, 102 Nw. U. L. REv. 1869, 1896-98 (2008). 
8 E.g., Sheldon Goldman, judicial Confirmation Wars: Ideology and the Batt/,e for the Fed-
eral Courts, 39 U. RlcH. L. REv. 871, 904-08 (2004); Orrin G. Hatch, The Constitution as the 
Playbookfor judicial Se/,ection, 32 HARvJ. L. & Pus. PoL'v 1035, 1038 (2009); David Ingram, 
Stealth War over judges, NAT'L LJ, Feb. 15, 2010, at 1. 
9 I rely here on Bermant et al., supra note l; Sheldon Goldman, Obama and the Federal 
judiciary: Great Expectations But Will He Have a Dickens of a Time Living up to Them?, 7 FORUM 
2, 9-11 ( 2009); Carl Tobias, The Federal Appellate Court Appointments Conundrum, 2005 UTAH 
L. REv. 743 (2005). 
10 See MILLER REPORT, supra note l; see also ABA, STANDING COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL 
JuDICIARV: WHAT IT Is AND How IT WORKS (1983); Sheldon Goldman et al., W Bush'sjudi-
cial Legacy, 92 JUDICATURE 258, 274 (2009). 
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which probe selections, and carefully reviews and casts votes on them; nomi-
nees approved may have chamber debates, when necessary, preceding floor 
ballots. 
C. The Contemporary Dilemma 
Article II's wording could suggest, and preeminent observers maintain, 
that the Framers intended senators to cabin unwise administration judicial 
choices; yet politics has suffused the process since the nation's establish-
ment.11 Politicization severely multiplied after President Richard Nixon 
staunchly pledged to demonstrably improve "law and order" by nominating 
"strict constructionists"12 and increased most prominently once Judge Robert 
Bork lost his dramatic 1987 Supreme Court nomination fight. 13 Acrimoni-
ous, crippling partisanship substantially rose, while divided government and 
the fervent hope that the party lacking White House control might secure the 
next presidential election and, consequently, make future appointments, 
supplied consummate incentive to procrastinate. Administrations, chamber 
and committee leaders, and numerous senators were partly responsible for 
multiple downward spiraling problems. 
Rather slow nominations may explain the dearth of confirmations. In 
early 1997 and 2001, Presidents Clinton and Bush submitted relatively few 
circuit prospects, and opponents directly leveled vociferous criticisms at 
many. 14 Both White Houses nominated more lawyers in sizable clusters near 
pertinent recesses; this stymied action. 15 Elected officials who forwarded per-
sons somewhat delayed the pace. In jurisdictions without senators from the 
11 THE FEDERALIST No. 76, at 414 (Alexander Hamilton) (E. H. Scott ed., 1898); see 
also CHRISTOPHER L. E1sGRUBER, THE NEXT JUSTICE: REPAIRING THE SUPREME CouRT 
APPOINTMENTS PROCESS (2007); MICHAEL j. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PRO-
CESS 28 (2000); SHELDON GoLDMAN, PICKING FEDERAL JUDGES (1997);JAN CRAWFORD GREEN-
BURG, SUPREME CONFLICT: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF THE UNITED 
STATES SUPREME COURT (2007). 
12 DAVID O'BRIEN, JUDICIAL ROULETTE: REPORT OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK 
FORCE ON JUDICIAL SELECTION 20 (1988); accord GoLDMAN, supra note 11, at 207 (citations 
omitted); Roger Hartley & Lisa M. Holmes, Increasing Senat,e Scrutiny of Lower Federal Court 
Nominees, 80 JuDICATURE 274, 275 (1997); Slotnick, supra note 4, at 228. 
13 See generally, e.g., MARK H. G1TENSTEIN, MATTERS OF PRINCIPLE: AN INSIDER'S AccouNT 
OF AMERICA'S REJECTION OF ROBERT BORK'S NOMINATION TO THE SUPREME COURT (1992); 
JEFFREY TooBIN, THE NINE: INSIDE THE SECRET WoRLD OF THE SUPREME COURT 18 (2007); see 
also David R. Stras, Understanding the New Politics of Judicial Appointments, 86 TEx. L. REv. 
1033, 1057-72 (2008). 
14 Press Release, White House, Office of the Press Sec'y, President Clinton Nominates 22 
for the Federal Bench (Jan. 7, 1997); Remarks Announcing Nominations for the Federal Judi-
ciary, 1 Pus. PAPERS 504-05 (May 9, 2001), available athttp://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/granule/ 
PPP-2001-bookl/PPP-2001-bookl-doc-pg504/ content-detail.html; see also Slotnick, supra 
note 4, at 243. See generally infra notes 17-18, 20, and accompanying text. 
15 Vacancies in the Federal Judiciary, supra note 5 (for years 1997 and 2001); see also 
James Oliphant, Obama Losing Chance to &shape judiciary, L.A TIMES (Mar. 15, 2010), 
http:/ /articles.latimes.com/2010/mar/15/nation/la-na-obamajudges15-2010mar15. 
Each failed to nominate for all openings, but nominating more than would be processed 
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chief executive's party, identifying the officers and treating specific participa-
tion requests consumed large amounts of time. 16 Bush's minimal consulta-
tion undercut selection, 17 and the drastically curtailed examination which 
Republicans accorded Clinton nominees might have fostered Democratic 
paybacks.18 Accentuated controversy respecting ABA activities confounded 
appointments. In 1997, Senator Orrin Hatch (R-Utah), the Judiciary Com-
mittee chair, discontinued formal American Bar participation regarding 
committee evaluation, although Clinton always used the material.19 During 
Bush's first weeks, he suspended ABA rankings prior to nominations, a deci-
sion which routinely stalled confirmations because Democrats invariably 
requested the assessments' completion ahead of merits votes.20 
The Judiciary Committee deserved partial responsibility for the small 
number of appointments when the panel failed to diligently study, conduct 
hearings, and vote on, more nominees. The Committee usually arranged 
panel hearings respecting a sole pick every month the chamber was in ses-
sion. 21 However, in 1997 and 2001, few jurists won confirmation, essentially 
due to resource inadequacies and multiple compelling political elements, 
was futile. They calibrated speed and scrutiny, as controversial nominees can delay the 
process. 
16 GOP senators demanded input and even sent names. Neil A. Lewis, Clinton Has a 
Chance to Shape the Courts, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 9, 1997), http:/ /www.nytimes.com/1997 /02/ 
09/us/clinton-has-a-chance-to-shape-the-courts.html; see also 143 CONG. REc. S2541 (daily 
ed. Mar. 19, 1997) (statement of Sen. Joe Biden). 
17 SJ. Cahn, Cox Passes on a Judicial Seat, DAILY PILOT (May 26, 2001), http:/ /arti-
cles.dailypilot.com/2001-05-26/ news/ export48535 _l_rep-coxjudicial-nominationjudicial-
seat; David L. Greene & Thomas Healy, Bush Sends judge List to Senate, BALT. SuN (May 10, 
2001), http:/ I articles.baltimoresun.com/2001-05-10/ news/01051001l2_l_senate-demo-
crats-appeals-court-confirmation-process; Henry Weinstein & Faye Fiore, Rep. Cox Likely 
judicial Nominee, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 5, 2001), http://articles.latimes.com/2001/apr/05/ 
news/mn-47161; see also Slotnick, supra note 4, at 234; Stras & Scott, supra note 7, at 1901; 
Press Release, White House Office of the Press Sec'y, supra note 14. 
18 Paul A. Gigot, How Feinstein is Repaying Bush on judges, WALL ST. J., May 9, 2001, at 
A26; Neil A. Lewis, Party Leaders Clash in Capitol Over Pace of Filling judgeships, N.Y. TIMES 
(May 10, 2002), http:/ /www.nytimes.com/2002/05/10/us/party-leaders-clash-in-capitol-
over-pace-of-fillingjudgeships.html; see also Tobias, supra note 9, at 764. 
19 Terry Carter, A Conservative juggernaut, A.B.A.J.,June 1997, at 32; N. Lee Cooper, 
Standing Up to Critical Scrutiny, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1997, at 6; see also Editorial, The ABA Plots a 
judicial Coup, WALL. ST.j. (Aug. 14, 2008), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB121867190633 
138889.html. 
20 Letter from Alberto Gonzales, White House Counsel, to Martha Barnett, ABA Presi-
dent (Mar. 22, 2001), available at http://abcnews.go.com/US/story?id=93754&page=l; see 
also Laura E. Little, The ABA 's Role in Prescreening Federal judicial Candidates: Are We Ready to 
Give Up on the Lawyers?, 10 WM. & MARY BILL RTs.]. 37 (2001); Goldman et al., supra note 
10, at 254. 
21 Carl Tobias, Choosing Federal judges in the Second Clinton Administration, 24 HASTINGS 
CONST. L.Q. 741, 742 (1997). Senator Joseph Biden (D-Del.), the Judiciary Committee 
Chair between 1987 and 1994, stated that the committee conducted two hearings every 
month. See 143 CONG. REc. S2538, S2539 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1997). 
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such as the opposition's ideological critiques lodged at circuit nominees.22 
Additional pressing congressional business and the Senate's unanimous-con-
sent procedure, which allows a lone member to halt ballots, explicate stymied 
nominee floor consideration. 
The persistent and modern openings concerns have numerous deleteri-
ous impacts. Both aspects severely pressure courts and frustrate counsel and 
litigants, who must compete for scarce judicial resources.23 Numbers of 
appeals proceed slowly because complex and expanding prosecutions mean 
that some district jurists conduct no civil trials, forcing a multitude of civil 
litigants to wait interminably.24 Throughout 1997, stunning case growth and 
protracted vacancies required that a few circuits suspend oral arguments.25 
Voluminous, complicated dockets and remarkably long vacancies created so 
much difficulty then and in 2001 that Chief Justice William Rehnquist 
astutely employed the unprecedented concept of publicly insisting that the 
executive branch and Senate, which different parties controlled, fill the 
seats.26 
22 Tobias, supra note 21; see Neil A. Lewis, Bush and Democrats in Senate Trade Blame for 
judge Shortage, N.Y. TIMES (May 4, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/05/04/us/bush-
and-democrats-in-senate-trade-blame-forjudge-shortage.html; Editorial, A judicial Nomina-
tions Scorecard, WASH. PosT, Aug. 9, 2002, availabf.e at http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P2-
380904.html. Nominees, who will enjoy life tenure and exercise the enormous power of 
the state, deseive scrutiny to insure that they are qualified. 
23 N.Y. Orr BAR, supra note 2, at 374. Vacancies had a statistically significant nine 
percent effect on circuit workloads between 1970 and 1992. Bermant et al., supra note 1, 
at 327; supra note 7; see Carl Tobias, Op. Ed., Act on Judges, SAN ANTONIO ExPREss-NEws, 
Dec. 31, 2011, at B7; Editorial, Vacancies Must Be Filf.ed Quickly, AruzONA REPUBLIC (Aug. 7, 
2011), http:/ /www.azcentral.com/ arizonarepublic/ opinions/ articles/20110807vacancies-
editorial.html. 
24 Ted Gest et al., The GOP'sjudicial Freeze, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., May 26, 1997, at 
23; Robert A. Schmidt, The Costs of judicial Delay, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 28, 1997; see also Gary 
Fields & John R. Emshwiller, Criminal Case Glut Impedes Civil Suits, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 10, 
2011), http:/ I online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204505304577001771159867642. 
html. 
25 See, e.g., Carl Tobias, Filling the Federal Appellate Openings on the 9th Circuit, 19 REv. 
LITIG. 233, 251 (2000); David G. Savage, Rehnquist Chides GOP for judicial Stalling, L.A. 
TIMES, Jan. 1, 1998, at Al. 
26 WILLIAM REHNQUIST, YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (1997 & 2001), 
available at http:/ /www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/year-endreports.aspx; 
Slotnick, supra note 4, at 233; see also Linda Greenhouse, Rehnquist Sees a Loss of Prospective 
judges, N.Y. TIMES Qan. 1, 2002), http:/ /www.nytimes.com/2002/0l/Ol/us/rehnquist-sees-
a-loss-of-prospectivejudges.html. For some analogous views, see A.B.A., REPORT TO THE 
HousE OF DELEGATES (2008), availabf.e at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/ 
aba/migrated/leadership/2008/annual/recommendations/OneHundredEighteen.doc& 
sa=U&ei=S8YrUYmKIOW70QHAmoGQBw&ved=OCBgQFjAA&usg=AFQjCNH6kzNAEfPO 
QG5CtOkSCaJEdbzYsA; Alfred P. Carlton, Jr., More and Faster-Now: The Crisis in the Federal 
judiciary, A.B.A. J., Apr. 2003, at 8; infra note 141. 
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II. OBAMA ADMINISTRATION JUDICIAL SELECTION 
A. Descriptive Evaluation 
Obama artfully crafted appointment plans, concentrating on numerous 
activities related to the circuits. He speedily drafted as White House Counsel 
experienced attorney Gregory Craig and other impressive lawyers who 
recruited designees.27 Vice President Joe Biden's lengthy Judiciary Commit-
tee service permitted him to offer many cogent insights, especially about 
smoothly confirming nominees. 28 The selection group foresaw and skillfully 
handled numbers of relevant matters, in particular a new Supreme Court 
vacancy, by delineating pertinent qualifications and compiling "short lists" of 
extraordinary possibilities. This White House assigned the Counsel's Office 
major appellate court responsibility and gave the DOJ several duties involving 
nominee preparation for the Senate process. Obama reinstated ABA scrutiny 
before making nominations. He determined that the ABA furnishes valuable 
perspectives; early inquiries unearth salient concerns, aiding chief executives 
and prospects in conserving resources and confining any embarrassment.29 
Obama instituted concerted efforts to vastly improve ethnic, gender, and 
sexual-preference diversity.30 He comprehensively approached less conven-
tional organizations, such as minority, community, and women's groups, 
which have copious information about numerous worthy candidates, as well 
27 Jon Ward, White House Beefs up Legal Staff, WASH. TIMES Uuly 21, 2009), http://www. 
washingtontimes.com/news/2009/jul/21/white-house-beefs-up-legal-staff/?feat=home_ 
headlines. I rely much in this subsection on the following: Sheldon Goldman et al., 
Obama's Judiciary at Midterm, 94 JuDICATURE 262 (2011); Charlie Savage, Obama Lags on 
judicial Picks, Limiting His Mark on Courts, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 17, 2012), http://www.nytimes. 
com/2012/ 08I18/ us/ politics/ obama-lags-on-filling-seats-in-thejudiciary. 
html?pagewanted=all; Toobin, supra note 4; Peter Baker & Adam Nagourney, Sotomayor 
Pick a Product of Lessons from Past Battles, N.Y. TIMES (May 27, 2009), http:/ /www.nytimes. 
com/2009/05/28/us/politics/28select.html?pagewanted=all;Jonathan Bernstein, Op-Ed., 
Empty Bench Syndrome, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 8, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/09/ 
opinion/09Bernstein.html. 
28 Peter Baker & Jeff Zeleny, Obama Hails judge as "Inspiring, " N.Y. TIMES (May 26, 
2009), http:/ /www.nytimes.com/2009/05/27 /us/politics/27court.html?pagewanted=all; 
Keith Koffler, Biden's Staff to Play Key Role in Sotomayor Confirmation, RoLL CALL (May 25, 
2009), http:/ /www.rollcall.com/ news/-35256-1.html; see generally GITENSTEIN, supra note 13 
(recounting Robert Bork's nomination). 
29 JEFFREY ToosIN, OATH: THE OsAMA WHITE HousE AND THE SUPREME CouRT 46 
(2012); Terry Carter, Do-Over: After an Eight-Year Pause, the ABA is Again Vetting Possible Fed-
eral Bench Nominees, A.B.A. J., May 2009, at 62; Doug Kendall, Confirmation Warriors: What's 
the Endgame for Obama's judicial Nominees?, SLATE (Oct. 8, 2010), http:/ /www.slate.com/ 
articles/ news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2010/10 /confirmation_ warriors.html; see also 
Josh Gerstein, Right Sees Law Group Tilting Left, POLITICO (Sept. 27, 2010), http://www. 
politico.com/news/stories/0910/42709.html (discussing ABA viewpoints); supra note 20; 
infra note 112 and accompanying text. 
30 I rely below on Nancy Scherer, Diversifjing the Federal Bench: Is Universal Legitimacy for 
the U.S. justice System Possible?, 105 Nw. U. L. REv. 587 (2011 ); Carl Tobias, Diversity and the 
Federal Bench, 87 WASH. U. L. REv. 1197 (2010); Goldman et al., supra note 27, at 288. 
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as politicians, especially certain minority and female lawmakers. They 
searched for, considered, and recommended innumerable qualified people 
of color, women, and out lesbian, gay, bisexual, or transgender (LGBT) 
counsel, helping specific designees navigate the appointments gauntlet. 
The President emphasized bipartisanship through rigorous consultation, 
seeking useful guidance from Democratic and Republican Judiciary Commit-
tee members and political figures in states which encountered vacancies 
before nominations. Many implemented commissions that ably picked num-
bers of exceptional individuals whom the officials suggested to the chief exec-
utive and whom he chose, but initiatives amply varied when they 
denominated preferences, ranked, or tendered a single candidate. 31 Most 
applicants possessed strong capabilities and contributed plentiful diversity 
vis-a-vis ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, and ideology.32 Creating new, 
and revamping extant, commissions, thoroughly interviewing and proposing 
choices, and efficaciously canvassing the input devoured limited resources; 
Obama's assistants expended considerable time seeking advice from both 
parties.33 
The White House controlled appointments. Courts of appeals include 
several contiguous jurisdictions and have perceptibly less frequent vacancies, 
which senators effectively deem more important, because circuits are essen-
tially courts of last resort for ninety-nine percent of filings and decide com-
plex questions regarding issues including terrorism and constitutional 
31 Bob Egelko, Feinstein Taps Bipartisan Panels to Pick Judges, S.F. GATE Qan. 5, 2009), 
http:/ /www.sfgate.com/politics/article/Feinstein-taps-bipartisan-panels-to-pickjudges-
3177869.php; Wis. FED. NOMINATING CoMM'N CHARTER (2008); see also Goldman, supra 
note 9 (describing this process); RACHEL CAUFIELD, INSIDE MERIT SELECTION (AJS 2012) 
(same); RussELL WHEELER & REBECCA LoVE KouRUs, OPTIONS FOR FEDERAL JumcIAL 
SCREENING COMMITTEES (IAALS 2010) (same); see also infra note 34 (same); infra notes 
81-83, 105-06, 113 and accompanying text (same). 
32 See Tricia Bishop, Davis Confirmed to 4th Circuit Court of Appeals, BALT. SuN (Nov. 10, 
2009), http:/ /articles.baltimoresun.com/2009-11-10/news/bal-md.davisl Onovl O_l_andre-
maurice-davis-appeals-court-appellate-bench (discussing diversity of Judge Andre Davis); 
Egelko, supra note 31 (discussing judicial diversity); Joe Ryan, U.S. Senate Confirms Judge 
Joseph Greenaway Jr. for Federal Appeals Court, STAR-LEDGER (Feb. 9, 2010), http:/ /www.nj. 
com/news/index.ssf/2010/02/new_jersey_judge_joseph_greena.html (discussing Judge 
Joseph Greenaway); infra notes 61-64. 
33 Some officials, namely Texas GOP Senators Kay Bailey Hutchison and John Comyn, 
even suggested names. See, e.g., Todd J. Gillman, Texas' open U.S. Attorney Posts Languish 
Under President Barack Obama, DALLAS MORNING NEWS (Aug. 8, 2010), http://www.dallas-
news.com/ news/ poli tics/local-poli tics/20100808-Texas-open-U-S-73 78.ece (discussing 
GOP senators' suggestion of names); Gary Martin, Obama Nominates First Federal Judge for 
Texas, SAN ANTONIO ExPREss-NEws Quly 14, 2010), http://www.mysanantonio.com/news/ 
politics/ article/ Obama-nominates-first-federaljudge-for-Texas-783165. php (regarding 
GOP senators' recommendation of Judge Diana Saldana); see also David Fomana, Judging 
Obama's Second Term, HuFF. PoST (Nov. 14, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-
fontana/obamajudicial-appointments-2nd-term_b_2131912.html (describing roles of 
White and Senate in the nominating process). 
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interpretation.34 The Administration encouraged legislators to send multi-
ple candidates and chose a nominee from the particular state in which the 
vacancy arose. Obama evidenced immense deference to politicians, basically 
assimilating many circuit and trial level appointments. 
The chief executive issued short press releases when gradually nominat-
ing a few attorneys simultaneously,35 unlike predecessors.36 He correspond-
ingly depoliticized selection by, for example, personally introducing only 
Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan, the tradition governing most pro-
spective Justices; both were sworn in at the Court, not the White House, a 
gesture that had enormous pragmatic and symbolic value primarily respect-
ing separation of powers.37 These measures departed from Bush's reliance 
on the White House to stage a ceremony when announcing the initial circuit 
nominees.38 The Obama Administration's conciliatory approach finds 
34 See Letter from Prof. Bruce Ackerman, et al., to President Barack Obama (Feb. 24, 
2010), available at http:/ /media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/ documents/let-
tertopresidentobama022410.pdf; David Fontana, Obama Should Pack the (Lawer) Courts, NEW 
REPUBLIC (Mar. 13, 2012), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/politics/101566/obarna-
symposiumjudge-appointment-federal-court; Neil A. Lewis, Move to Limit Clinton's judicial 
Choices Fails, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 30, 1997), http:/ /www.nytimes.com/1997 /04/30/us/move-
to-limit-clinton-s-judicial-choices-fails.html; RICHARD PosNER, THE FEDERAL CouRTs 81-93 
(1985); Arthur D. Hellman, The Shrunken Docket of the Rehnquist Court, 1996 SuP. CT. R.Ev. 
403 (1996); Stras, supra note 13, at 1069-71, 1073. 
35 Press Release, White House, Office of the Press Sec'y, President Obama Announces 
judge Gerard Lynch for United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, judge Andre Davis for 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, (Apr. 2, 2009), available at http:/ /www. 
white house .gov I the_press_office/Presiden t-Obama-Announces:Judge-Gerard-Lynch-for-
U ni ted-States-Court-of-Appeals-for-the-Second-Circuit:J udge-Andre-Davis-for-the-U ni ted-
States-Court-of-Appeals; Press Release, White House, Office of the Press Sec'y, President 
Obama Nominates judge Joseph A. Greenaway, Jr. for the United States Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit, and judge Beverly B. Martin for the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, 
(June 19, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/president· 
obama-nominates-judgejoseph-a-greenawayjr-third-circuit-andjudge-bever. 
36 See supra text accompanying note 15; see also Editorial, Congress Needs to Stap Stone-
walling on Federal Court Vacancies, WASH. PosT (Sept. 9, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost. 
com/wp-dyn/ content/ article/2010/09/08/ AR20100908064 76.html (describing Obama's 
nomination of smaller groups of candidates). 
37 See, e.g., Peter Baker & Jeff Zeleny, Obama Picks Kagan as Justice Nominee, N.Y. TIMES 
(May 9, 2010), http:/ /www.nytimes.com/2010/05/10/us/politics/lOcourt.html (discuss-
ing nomination of Justice Elena Kagan); Paul Kane & Robert Barnes, Senate Confirms Elena 
Kagan's Nomination to Supreme Court, WASH. PosT (Aug. 6, 2010), http://www.wash· 
ingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/ content/ article/2010/08/05/ AR201008050524 7.html (discuss-
ing Justice Elena Kagan's swearing in ceremony); Shailagh Murray & Michael D. Shear, 
First Latina Picked for Supreme Court; GOP Faces Delicate Task in opposition, WASH. PosT (May 
27, 2009), http:/ /articles.washingtonpost.com/2009-05-27 /news/36845463_l_group-<>f-
white-firefighters-sonia-sotomayor-firefighters-case (discussing nomination of Justice Sonia 
Sotomayor); Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Sotomayor, a Trailblazer and a Dreamer, N.Y. TIMES (May 26, 
2009), http:/ /www.nytimes.com/2009/05/27 /us/politics/27websotomayor.html (detail-
ing the life of Justice Sonia Sotomayor). 
38 TooBIN, supra note 29, at 120; Neil A. Lewis, Bush Appeals for Peace on His Picks for the 
Bench, N.Y. TIMES (May 10, 2001), http:/ /www.nytimes.com/2001/05/10/us/bush-appeals-
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expression in a promise to stop confirmation wars by aggressively consulting 
each party and submitting a multitude of fine consensus possibilities.39 
Often before nominations, and invariably subsequently, the chief execu-
tive and chamber members, namely the leadership, attempted to cooperate. 
In facilitating efficacious processing, the White House and the Justice Depart-
ment coordinated avidly with Senator Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.), the Judiciary 
Committee chair, who schedules panel hearings and votes; Senator Harry 
Reid (D-Nev.), the Majority Leader, who plans nominee Senate floor consid-
eration; and their Grand Old Party (GOP) counterparts, Senators Jeff Ses-
sions (Ala.), whom Charles Grassley (Iowa) succeeded in 2011, and Mitch 
McConnell (Ky.). 
The committee promptly instituted searching analyses with thorough 
questionnaires, comprehensive hearings, and fast votes. Both parties cooper-
ated actively on nominee examinations. For instance, when Leahy diligently 
convened a hearing so fast that Republicans lacked enough preparation 
time, he quickly set another; when the party sought a pair of sessions for 
Professor Goodwin Liu, whom it determined was controversial, Leahy gener-
ously acceded.40 The Ranking Member conscientiously deployed the rare 
action of granting two Fourth Circuit nominees, Judges Albert Diaz and 
James Wynn, a sole hearing.41 
Republicans coordinated less attentively than the political figures might, 
nonetheless. The lawmakers systematically held over panel ballots seven days 
for-peace-on-his-picks-for-the-bench.html; Charlie Savage, Obama Backers Fear Opportunities 
to Reshape judiciary Are Slipping Away, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14, 2009), http:/ /www.nytimes.com/ 
2009/11/15/us/politics/15judicial.html; see generally Sheldon Goldman et al., W Bush: 
Remaking the judiciary: Like Father Like Son?, 86 JUDICATURE 282 (2003) (detailing President 
George W. Bush's philosophy in seating federal judges). 
39 See Jeffrey Toobin, One Year: Where Are the Judges?, NEW YORKER (Jan. 20, 2010), 
http:/ /www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2010/01/one-year-where-are-the-
judges.html; Letter from President Barack Obama to Sen. Harry Reid et al., (Sept. 30, 
2010) [hereinafter Obama Letter]; David G. Savage, Senate Face-Off Is Due over Judicial Nomi-
nee, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 16, 2009), http://articles.latimes.com/2009/nov/16/nation/na-
judges16. 
40 Maureen Groppe, No Sparks Fly at Hearing, INDIANAPOLIS STAR (Apr. 30, 2009), 
http:/ /www.indystar.com/article/20090430/NEWS05/904300456/No-sparks-fly-hearing; 
David Ingram, Switching Teams: Specter's Move Upsets GOP judge Strategy, NAT'L LJ., May 4, 
2009, at LTl; see Toobin, supra note 4; infra note 102. For audio of Liu's confirmation 
hearing, see Senate Judiciary Comm., Hearing Before the Senate judiciary Committee on Goodwin 
Liu to be a judge for the Ninth Circuit (Mar. 2, 2011 ), http:/ /www.senate.gov/fplayers/Comm-
Player/ commF!ashPlayer.cfm?fn=judiciary03021 l p&st=xxx. See also Richard Painter, Qual-
ified, Measured, and Mainstream: Why the Senate Should Confirm Goodwin Liu, HuFF. PosT 
(Mar. 2, 2011, 8:39 AM), http://www.huflingtonpost.com/richard-painter/qualified-mea-
sured-and-ma_b_829298.html; Savage, supra note 27; infra note 136. 
41 Nominations of James A. Wynn, Jr., Nominee to be United States Circuit judge for the Fourth 
Circuit; And Albert Diaz., Nominee to be United States Circuit Court judge for the Fourth Circuit: 
Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the judiciary, 111 th Cong. (2009), availab/,e at http:/ /www. 
gpo.gov / fdsys/ pkg/ CHRG-111 shrg63004/html/ CHRG-111 shrg63004.h tm; Barbara Bar-
rett, Senate Approves Wynn for Fourth Circuit, Diaz Still Waits, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Aug. 6, 
2010. 
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without meaningful explanation for nominees the committee in turn per-
functorily reported the following business meeting. Sessions even delayed 
review of Judges Diaz, Wynn, and Barbara Keenan, although he glowingly 
complimented the jurists' qualifications and the Fourth Circuit urgently 
required that nominees assume the court's sustained openings.4 2 
During 2009, floor activity proceeded slowly. The chamber approved 
merely three nominees. Reid incessantly pursued cooperation with McCon-
nell and his colleagues, yet they effectively did not reciprocate. The Minority 
Leader insistently opposed ballots for pending designees until Sotomayor's 
appointment; no pick was confirmed by August.43 He entered few specific 
voting concords on appellate prospects.44 Leahy said that his party con-
sumed months after nominees won the committee's approval carefully seek-
ing accords on many people who in turn easily captured appointment. 
Illustrative was Second Circuit Judge Gerard Lynch; the jurist waited twelve 
prolonged weeks before attaining confirmation ninety-four to three.45 
42 Hearing, supra note 41; Hearing Before the Senate judiciary Comm. on Barbara Milano 
Keenan to be a judge for the Fourth Circuit (Oct. 7, 2009), http:/ /wwwJudiciary.senate.gov/ 
hearings/hearing.cfm?id=e655f9e2809e54 76862f735dal5 l 20db; Nomination of Barbara 
Milano Keenan, Nominee to be U.S. Circuit Judge for the Fourth Circuit: Hearing Before the Senate 
judiciary Comm., Jllth Cong. (2009), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-
lllshrg63004/html/CHRG-lllshrg63004.htm; Senate Judiciary Comm., Exec. Business 
Mtg., (Oct. 29, 2009): see id., Oct. 22, 2009 (holding over Keenan); id., Dec. 17, 2009 (Ses-
sions found Democrats' urging Keenan's confirmation like a child who murders his par-
ents and complains that he is an orphan); id., Jan. 21, 2010 (holding over Diaz and Wynn); 
id., Nov. 29, 2012 (providing one recent example of GOP holding over 5 nominees); 
Ingram, supra note 8 (providing other examples). 
43 Goldman et al., supra note 27; 156 CONG. REc. S904 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 2010) (state-
ment of Sen. Patrick Leahy); see also George Packer, The Empty Chamber: just How Broken Is 
the Senate?, NEw YoRKER (Aug. 9, 2010), http:/ /www.newyorker.com/reporting/2010/08/ 
09/100809fa_fact_packer (describing this opposition); Savage, supra note 27 (same). 
44 I rely here and below on Senator Leahy's statement, supra note 43; Joan Biskupic, 
Republicans Lead Obama in War for judicial Dominance, CHI. TRIB. (Oct. 5, 2012), http:/ I 
articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-10-05 I news/ sns-rt-us-usa-obama-appealscourt-
sbre89405e-20121004_l_caitlin-halligan-elena-kagan-appeals-courts; Michael A. Fletcher, 
Obama Criticized as Too Cautious, Slow on judicial Posts, WASH. PosT (Oct. 16, 2009), http:/ I 
www.washingtonpost.com/ wp-dyn/ content/ article/2009I10I15IAR2009l01504083.html. 
45 155 CONG. REc. S9541 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 2009). Judges Andre Davis and Joseph 
Greenaway did wait longer. Id. at Sll,282 (daily ed. Nov. 9, 2009); 156 CONG. REc. S510 
(daily ed. Feb. 9, 2010); Carl Tobias, Op.-Ed.,Fill the 4th Circuit's Vacancies Now, BALT. SuN, 
Oct. 6, 2009, at Al3, available at http:/ /infoweb.newsbank.com/iw-search/we/InfoWeb?p_ 
action=doc&p_topdoc=l&p_docnurn=l&p_sort=YMD_date:D&p_product=NewsBank&p_ 
text_direct-0=docurnent_id=%28%2012B3250E752B4078%20%29&p_docid=l2B3250E75 
2B4078&p_theme=aggdocs&p_queryname=l2B3250E752B4078&f_openurl=yes&p_nbid= 
053F4BNHMTM2MzAOODQwNi42NDQ3MTQ6MToxMToxNDEuM1Y2LjAuMA&&p_ 
multi=MBDB; supra notes 32, 35. But see 156 CoNG. REc. at S519 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 2010) 
(statement of Sen. Jeff Sessions) (commenting on Judge Greenaway's appointment). 
Others waited much longer. See Obama Letter, supra note 39; infra notes 57, 59, and 
accompanying text. 
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The GOP reserved much debate time on selections but employed practi-
cally none and insisted that the Senate hold roll call votes for distinguished 
aspirants who ultimately polled extensive support. Judge Beverly Martin 
illuminates the concepts; Republicans demanded one hour, yet needed min-
utes, after which the chamber approved the jurist ninety-seven to zero.46 The 
unanimous consent process enables a lone member to stall nominees. Plac-
ing anonymous holds or those with minimal reasons on seasoned noncontro-
versial candidates violates a lengthy tradition. It makes nominee advocates 
file cloture petitions, wasting scarce debate time; protracts vacancies; and 
confounds swift, economical, and fair case resolution. The abominable 
machinations implicating Judge Keenan elucidate these problems because 
the able, uncontroversial nominee waited four months until the chamber 
agreed on cloture ninety-nine to zero and confirmed her by the identical 
margin.47 
During 2009, Democrats sought cloture for one nominee essentially 
when promoting a Senate ballot; that provoked Republicans and delayed 
related wonderful choices.48 This initiative, as with Keenan, vividly epito-
mized strident partisanship. In March, Obama attempted to elevate South-
ern District of Indiana Judge David Hamilton, the chief executive's first 
nominee.49 He proposed the jurist after meticulously consulting Indiana 
46 156 CONG. REc. Sl3 (daily ed. Jan. 20, 2010); see James Fallows, American Dysfunction 
Watch: State of the judiciary, ATLANTIC Uune 5, 2012, 8:19 A.M.), http://www.theatlantic. 
com/ politics/ archive/2012/ 06/ american-dysfunction-watch-state-of-thejudiciary /2580 
73/ (discussing length of vacancies); Bill Rankin, Senate OKs Martin for U.S. Appeals Court, 
ATLANTA]. CONST., Jan. 21, 2010, at B4 (discussing unanimous confirmation of Judge Bev-
erly Martin). 
47 156 CONG. REc. S908, S910 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 2010); see THOMAS E. MANN & NoRMAN 
J. ORNSTEIN, h's EVEN WoRSE THAN IT LooKS: How THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM 
COLLIDED WITH THE NEW POLITICS OF EXTREMISM 94 (2012); Amanda Becker, Senators' Use of 
"Anonymous Hold" Contributes to Backlog of Stalled Judicial Nominations, WASH. PosT (Sept. 27, 
2010), http:/ /www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/ content/article/2010/09 /24/ AR201009 
2406035.html (discussing stalling of judicial nominees); Doug Kendall, The Bench in Purga-
tory: The New Republican Obstructionism on Obama 's judicial Nominees, SLATE (Oct. 26, 2009), 
http:/ /www.slate.com/ articles/ news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2009I10 I the_bench_in 
_purgatory.html (same). But see 156 CoNG. REc. at S519, supra note 45. 
48 Dana Milbank, Filibusted, WASH. PosT (Nov. 18, 2009), http://articles.washington 
post.com/2009-11-18/ opinions/ 36835604_l_filibuster-nominees-republican-senators; Carl 
Tobias, Op. Ed., Ending "Confirmation Wars": Despite Rancor Over Hamilton Nomination, There 
are Signs These Fights May Be Over, BALT. SuN, Nov. 30, 2009, at Al5; see also David Fontana, 
Going Robe, NEw REPUBLIC (Dec. 17, 2009), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/environ-
ment-energy/going-robe (discussing this delay); Kendall, supra note 29 (same). 
49 TooBIN, supra note 29, at 121-22; Press Release, White House, Office of the Press 
Sec'y, President Obama Announces David Hamilton for the United States 7th Circuit Court of 
Appeals (Mar. 17, 2009), available at http:/ /www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/presi-
dent-obama-announces-david-hamilton-united-states-7th-circuit-court-appeals; Michael A. 
Fletcher, Obama Names judge to Appeals Court, WASH. PosT (Mar. 18, 2009), http:/ /www. 
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/ content/article/2009/03/17 / AR2009031703031.html; Neil 
A. Lewis, Moderate Is Said to Be Pick for Court, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 17, 2009), http://www. 
nytimes.com/2009/03/17 /us/politics/l 7nominate.html; Savage, supra note 27; see Al 
2013] SENATE GRIDLOCK AND FEDERAL JUDICIAL SELECTION 2245 
Senators Richard Lugar (R) and Evan Bayh (D), who in fact promptly, con-
vincingly, and "enthusiastically supported" confirmation, due to his impecca-
ble record on the district bench and well qualified ABA rating.50 Obama 
forwarded the judge, exemplifying a pledge to leave the "confirmation wars 
behind us."51 
Despite Hamilton's strengths, GOP politicians opposed the jurist. Ses-
sions alleged the President "chose to set an aggressive tone" with his initial 
nominee, the ex-board member for the Indiana chapter of the American 
Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), while arguing this nomination was extremely 
"controversial" because the judge harbored a "political agenda," subscribing 
to precepts, which included a "living" Constitution and "so-<:alled empa-
thy."52 Sessions orchestrated a filibuster, but ten Republican colleagues 
joined Democrats' adoption of cloture after robust, frank debate.53 Central 
was Hamilton's opinion regarding legislative prayers during Indiana state-
house proceedings. The Ranking Member strenuously urged that the nomi-
nee had authorized Muslim, not Christian, prayers. 54 The majority 
lawmakers accurately disputed Sessions's characterization, asserting that the 
nominee plainly respected the Court's jurisprudence. Bayh, whom Hamilton 
earlier served as Indiana gubernatorial counsel, mounted efficacious 
defenses against the unfounded criticisms, proclaiming that the jurist "is not 
hostile to religion or Jesus ... [and] was baptized ... by his father," a long-
time minister.55 Senators approved Hamilton, yet nine GOP members voting 
Kamen, Filling Partisan Benches, WASH. PoST (Aug. 12, 2011), http://articles.washington 
post.com/2011-08-12/ politics/ 35271236_l_downgrade-russian-prime-minister-paddy-
power (discussing lack of nominations). 
50 156 CoNG. REc. S904, supra note 43; Fletcher, supra note 44; Savage, supra note 39; 
Toobin, supra note 4. 
51 Savage, supra note 39; see also Kendall, supra note 29; Savage, supra note 38; Toobin, 
supra note 4. 
52 155 CoNG. REc. Sll,412-14 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 2009) (statement of Sen. Jeff Ses-
sions); 155 CONG. REc. Sl0,753 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 2009) (same); see infra note 71 and 
accompanying text; 156 CoNG. REc. Sl0,868, 10,870, 10,887 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 2010) 
(statement of Sen. Jeff Sessions) ("[I] t seems if you have the ACLU DNA, you get a pretty 
good leg up on being nominated by this President .... [W]e keep seeing the ACLU 
chromosome."). 
53 155 CONG. REc. Sll,421-22 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 2009); Ingram, supra note 8; 
Milbank, supra note 48; Savage, supra note 39. 
54 155 CoNG. REc. at Sll,414-15 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 2009); see Hinrichs v. Bosma, 400 
F. Supp. 2d 1103 (S.D. Ind. 2005); Editorial, Thank Allah It's Friday, WASH. TIMES (Jan. 22, 
2010), http:/ /www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010 /jan/22/ thank-allah-its-friday I; see 
also Nan Aron, Op-Ed., GOP Senators Perfect Art of Stalling, Pounco (Feb. 2, 2010, 5: 12 AM), 
http:/ /www.politico.com/news/stories/0210/32342.html (describing this incident); Dah-
lia Li th wick, Jesus vs. Allah: The Fight Over God's Secular Title, SIATE (Nov. 22, 2009), http:/ I 
www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2009/11/jesus_vs_allah.html 
(assessing Judge Hamilton's opinion). 
55 155 CoNG. REc. at Sll,411-12 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 2009) (statement of Sen. Evan 
Bayh); see also Fletcher, supra note 44; Obama Letter, supra note 39. 
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for cloture ultimately rejected the preeminent judge even while appreciating 
that the nominee deserved a chamber ballot.56 
The year 2010 and later years resembled the first. The Senate minority 
party continued directly invoking automatic holds related to dynamic nomi-
nees whom the committee reported the succeeding meeting and putting 
chamber secret and unexplained holds on very competent, noncontroversial 
possibilities with home state politician support; McConnell frequently 
eschewed time accords. Keenan's ninety-nine to zero cloture and confirma-
tion votes, discussed above, were pernicious specific illustrations. However, a 
plethora of analogous examples slowed consideration. The GOP afforded 
five 2010 picks ballots only upon the year's end; the Fourth Circuit's Diaz 
waited thirteen months, although the North Carolina senators lauded him 
and won unanimous roll call appointment by championing the accomplished 
jurist on the floor; 2011 witnessed merely nine confirmations; and the minor-
ity improperly kept lawyer Edward DuMont and Professor Victoria Nourse, 
meritorious nominees, stalled more than one year for panel hearings the 
candidates never received while it addressed Eleventh Circuit Judge 
Adalberto Jose Jordan like Keenan.57 
In 2009, Obama mustered a dozen, and subsequently proffered twenty-
nine, stellar circuit nominees.58 During his beginning year, the chamber 
approved three prospects while the committee reported six others. The fol-
lowing year, thirteen had appointments, with the committee approving four 
more. During 2011, nine were confirmed, and the panel reported three 
others. Finally, last year, five captured Senate approval and four more com-
mittee approval.59 Obama proposed Sotomayor promptly when Justice David 
56 155 CONG. REc. Sll,544, 11,552 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 2009); see Kate Phillips, Hamilton 
Confirmed for Appeals Court, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 20, 2009), http://query.nytimes.com/gst/ 
fullpage.html?res=9B05E6DC103FF933Al5752ClA96F9C8B63; infra note 88 and accompa-
nying text (affording effects of cloture's use). 
57 Judge Jane Stranch was treated similarly to Judge Diaz. 156 CoNG. REc. S6011 (daily 
ed. July 20, 2010) (statement of Sen. Lamar Alexander); id. at S7009 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 
2010); id. at Sl0,704 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 2010); 158 CONG. REc. S558 (daily ed. Feb. 13, 
2012) (discussing Judge Jordan); id. at S673 (daily ed. Feb. 15, 2012) (same); DOJ OFFICE 
LEGAL PoL'Y, Judicial Nominations (2009-2012), availabl,e at http://wwwJustice.gov/ 
archive/ olp/judicialnominationsl 12.htm (detailing judicial nomination statistics); Letter 
from Edward DuMont, Partner at Wilmer Hale, to President Barack Obama, Nov. 4, 2011; 
Savage, supra note 27; Bruce Vielmetti, Nourse Asks Obama to Withdraw her Nomination to 
Federal Appeals Court, MILWAUKEE]. SENTINEL (Jan. 19, 2012), availabl,e at http://wwwJson-
line.com/blogs/news/137702938.html (detailing letter from Prof. Victoria Nourse to Pres-
ident Barack Obama); infra note 91. 
58 Vacancies in the Federal Judiciary, supra note 5 (for years 2009-2013); see DO] 
OFFICE LEGAL PoL'v, supra note 57 (detailing nominations); Savage, supra note 38 (same); 
infra note 91 and accompanying text (same). See generally Doug Kendall, Fill the Bench Now, 
SLATE (Feb. 5, 2010), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/ 
2010/02/fill_the_bench_now.html (discussing nominations from President Obama). 
59 Appointees in 2009 were Davis, Hamilton, and Lynch; 2010 were Denny Chin, Diaz, 
Greenaway, Keenan, Raymond Lohier, Martin, Scott Matheson, Mary Murguia, Kathleen 
O'Malley, Stranch, 0. Rogeriee Thompson, Thomas Vanaskie, and Wynn; 2011 were Susan 
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Souter chose to retire and Kagan as quickly for Justice John Paul Stevens's 
vacancy; expeditiously processing both Supreme Court nominees was impera-
tive. 60 Thirteen possibilities are experienced Clinton districtjurists, two are 
capable magistrate judges,61 and seven nominees currently are prominent 
state court jurists. With half on benches, that phenomenon apparently 
portends the institution of a career judiciary.62 Many earned the best ABA 
ranking: well qualified.63 These judges improve ethnic, gender, and sexual-
preference diversity in the circuits: eight are African Americans, four are 
Asian Americans, four are Latinos, fifteen are women, and a single candidate 
is openly gay.64 
Carney, Morgan Christen, Bernice Donald, Christopher Droney, Henry Floyd, James 
Graves, Stephen Higginson, Jimmie Reyna, and Evan Wallach; and 2012 were Andrew Hur-
witz, Jordan, Jacqueline Nguyen, Stephanie Thacker, and Paul Watford. DOJ OFFICE 
LEGAL PoL'v, supra note 57; Savage, supra note 27. 
60 The crucial need to have all Justices for the 2009 term was exacerbated with the 
September 9th argument over Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). See, e.g., David 
G. Savage, Hilary: The Law Changer, 95 A.B.A.J. 24 (2009) (discussing Citizens United); Rob-
ert Barnes & Dan Eggen, Court Rejects CO'TjJorate Political Spending Limits, WASH. PosT Qan. 
22, 2010), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/201 O-Ol-22/politics/36798985_1_corpora-
tions-free-speech-majority-cast (same); Adam Liptak, Justices, 5-4, Reject CO'TjJorate Spending 
Limit, N.Y. TIMES Qan. 21, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/0l/22/us/politics/ 
22scotus.html (same); Toobin, supra note 39; see also supra note 37. 
61 The thirteen are Robert Chatigny, Chin, Donald, Droney, Greenaway, Jordan, Mar-
tin, Murguia, O'Malley, and Vanaskie, and the 2009 appointees. See supra note 59. The 
Magistrate Judges are Robert Bacharach and Patty Shwartz. Nguyen was also an Obama 
district appointee. See DO] OFFICE LEGAL PoL'Y, supra note 57; Emily Bazelon, The Supreme 
Court's Painful Season, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 5, 2011), www.nytimes.com/2011/08/07 /maga-
zine/the-supreme-courts-painful-season.html (discussing President Obama's Supreme 
Court Justices); Sherilynn A. Ifill, Storming the Court?, THE RooT (Nov. 18, 2009, 6:43 AM), 
http://www.theroot.com/views/storming-court (arguing that President Obama should 
appoint liberal judges to counter conservative judges). 
62 The seven are Christen, Diaz, Graves, Hurwitz, Keenan, Thompson, and Wynn. Ele-
vation is a venerable tool. Federal judges have Senate approval, accessible records, and 
prompt FBI and ABA review. See Tobias, supra note 21, at 752; Neil A. Lewis, Bush Picking 
the Kind of Judges Reagan Favored, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 10, 1990), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
1990/04/l O/us/bush-picking-the-kind-ofjudges-reagan-favored.html; Ruth Marcus, Bush 
Quietly Fosters Conservative Trend in Courts, WASH. PosT, Feb. 18, 1991, at Al; see infra note 68 
and accompanying text. But see David Fontana & Micah Schwartzman, Old World, NEW 
REPUBLIC Quly 17, 2009), www.newrepublic.com/article/politics/ old-world (arguing that 
President Obama should appoint younger federal judges). For a "career judiciary," see 
Goldman, supra note 38, at 305; RUSSELL WHEELER, THE CHANGING FACE OF THE FEDERAL 
BENCH 7-9 (Brookings Inst. 2009), available at http://www.brookings.edu/-/media/ 
research/files/papers/2009/8/federaljudiciary-wheeler/08_federaljudiciary_wheeler. 
pdf. 
63 See ABA STANDING COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, RATINGS OF ARTICLE III JUDICIAL NOMI-
NEES, 11 lTH CONG. (2010); ABA STANDING COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, RATINGS OF ARTICLE III 
JUDICIAL NOMINEES, 112TH CONG. (2012). 
64 Davis, Donald, Graves, Greenaway, Lohier, Thompson, Watford, and Wynn are Afri-
can Americans. Chin, Liu, Nguyen, and Sri Srinivasan are Asian Americans. Diaz, Jordan, 
Murguia, and Reyna are Latinos. Carney, Christen, Donald, Caitlin Halligan, Keenan, Mar-
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B. Critical Evaluation 
1. Positive Aspects 
The White House's leadership reaped particular advantages. Obama 
confirmed two sterling Justices and thirty preeminent court of appeals jurists 
while concomitantly sending eleven additional competent individuals; the 
panel duly reported all who secured committee ballots. Thorough, early, 
and persistent consultation with home state politicians sustained the smooth 
nomination and confirmation of quite a few talented picks and circum-
scribed the divisiveness and corrosive paybacks which have long subverted 
the appellate process.65 For instance, ten Republicans supported Hamilton's 
cloture petition; senators may have believed that the President's nominee was 
entitled to an up or down vote.66 More cooperation seemingly facilitated 
appointments, increasing public regard for the executive, chamber, selec-
tion, nominees, confirmees, and circuits.67 The administration calibrated 
multiple priorities well. It sagely emphasized appeals courts over district 
courts, given the comparative importance of appellate tribunals, and particu-
larly emphasized prominent numbered circuits, especially the Second and 
Fourth, in light of their vacancies. 
Promoting candidates who are court members necessarily furnishes ben-
efits. Most significant, the judges have acquired copious pertinent expertise, 
so appointees can immediately assume the critical task of resolving gigantic 
appeals court dockets. The nominees present full records that the White 
House, FBI, ABA, Senate, and citizens easily discover; many impressive 
Obama prospects and confirmees enjoy the finest ABA ratings.68 
Improved ethnic, gender, and sexual-preference diversity confers 
numerous advantages. The skilled people of color, women, and LGBT jurists 
serving on the regional circuits professionally discharge the usual judicial 
responsibilities, yet supply distinct related benefits. The jurists augment how 
colleagues understand and treat complex questions about matters including 
tin, Murguia, Nguyen, Nourse, O'Malley, Jill Pryor, Shwartz, Strauch, Thacker, and 
Thompson are women. Edward DuMont is openly gay. See John Schwartz, For Obama, a 
Record on Diversity But Delays on Judicial Confirmations, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 7, 2011), http:/ I 
www.nytimes.com/201 l/08/07 /us/politics/07courts.html. Obama's efforts, such as 
increasing diversity and consultation, resemble Clinton's. See Sheldon Goldman, judicial 
Selection Under Clinton: A Midterm Examination, 78 JUDICATURE 276, 276 ( 1995); Tobias, supra 
note 21. 
65 Compare supra notes 6-26 and accompanying text, with supra notes 27-41 and 
accompanying text. 
66 See supra text accompanying notes 53, 56. But see infra note 140 (discussing use of 
filibusters). They may have wanted consistency with prior criticism of Democrats' filibuster 
use. For other examples, see supra text accompanying notes 40-41, 47. 
67 See 156 CONG. REc. S904, supra note 43; see also Tobias, supra note 9, at 743; Obama 
Letter, supra note 39. 
68 See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 104, 112, 114, and 
accompanying text (demonstrating those records and fine ABA ratings). 
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capital punishment and corporate speech,69 while the judges possess salutary 
different perspectives respecting associated fields, notably criminal and 
employment law, which they often confront. 70 Some minority, female, and 
LGBT confirmees and nominees can broaden ideological diversity; the jurists 
apparently concur with empathy and a living Constitution.71 Insofar as possi-
ble candidates have moderate views, Obama could justify this; he essentially 
nullified ideology's salience72 and might now want to balance conservative 
appellate judges.73 Persons of color, women, and LGBT court members nar-
row ethnic, gender, sexual-preference, and similar biases that plague the jus-
tice system. 74 Circuits which resemble America inspire expanded public 
confidence.75 Diversity's increase also can underscore the administration's 
69 See Theresa M. Beiner, The Elusive (But Worthwhile) Quest for a Diverse Bench in the New 
Millennium, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 597, 599-600, 610-17 (2003); Tracey E. George, Court 
Fixing, 43 Aruz. L. REv. 9, 19-21 (2001). 
70 See, e.g., Pat K. Chew & Robert E. Kelley, Myth of the Color-Blind judge: An Empirical 
Analysis of Racial Harassment Cases, 86 WASH. U. L. REv. 1117 (2009); Mark Curriden, Ti~ 
ping the Scales, AB.A. J., July 2010, at 37, 42 (2010); George, supra note 69, at 18-25; 
Madhavi McCall, Structuring Gender's Impact: judicial Voting Across Criminal Justice Cases, 36 
AM. POLITICS REsEARCH 264 (2008); Jennifer L. Peresie, Note, Female judges Matter. Gender 
and Collegial Decisionmaking in the Federal Appellate Courts, 114 YALE L.]. 1759 (2005); Lauren 
Collins, Number Nine, NEW YoRKER Qan. 11, 2010), http:/ /www.newyorker.com/reporting/ 
2010/01/11/1001 llfa_fact_collins; sources cited supra note 30. But see Stephen]. Choi et 
al., judging Women, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 504 (2011). 
71 See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OuR DEMOCRACY WoRK (2010); DAVID A. STRAUSS, 
THE LIVING CONSTITUTION (2010); Lynne N. Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L. 
REv. 1574 (1987); Cass R. Sunstein, The Hidden Stakes of the Election, N.Y. REv. BKS. (Oct. 9, 
2012), http:/ /www.nybooks.com/blogs/ nyrblog/2012/ oct/09 /hidden-stakes-election/. 
But seeA..'ITONIN SCALIA & BRYAN GARNER, READING LAw (2012); Curt Levey, Living Constitu-
tion, Rl.P., NAT'L REv. (Sept. 30, 2005, 4:09 PM), http://old.nationalreview.com/com-
ment/levey200509301609.asp; infra note 72. 
72 He may find political branches better adopt social change than unelected judges. 
Justin Driver, Obama's Law, NEW REPUBLIC Qune 30, 2011), http://www.newrepublic.com/ 
article/ politics/ magazine/8964 7 / obama-legal-philosophy-laurence-tribe; Too bin, supra 
note 4. Sotomayor and some circuit picks disavowed empathy. 156 CONG. REc. S520 (daily 
ed. Feb. 9, 2010) (statement of Sen. Jeff Sessions); see supra text accompanying notes 
35-38. 
73 Herman Schwartz, Federal Judiciary Failures, NATION Qan. 2, 2013), http:/ /www. 
thenation.com/ article/ 171976/ obamas-federaljudiciary-failures; Russell Wheeler, How 
Might the Obama Administration Affect the Composition of the U.S. Courts of Appeals?, BROOKINGS 
INST. (Mar. 18, 2009), http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2009/03/18-courts-
wheeler. His elections could be mandates for more balance. 
74 See Report of the First Circuit, Gender, Race and Ethnic Bias Task Forces, 9 B.U. 
Pus. INT. LJ. 173 (1999); FINAL REPORT, NINTH CIRCUIT TASK FoRCE ON RAcIAL, RELIGIOUS 
& ETHNIC FAIRNESS ( 1997). See generally REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE 
169-70 (1990) available at www.fjc.gov.public /pdf.nsf/lookup/repfcsc.pdf/file/repfesc. 
pdf. (advocating education of judges on racial, ethnic, and gender discrimination). 
75 See, e.g., Sheldon Goldman, A Profile of Carter's Judicial Nominees, 62 JUDICATURE 246, 
253 (1978); Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, Only Skin Deep?: The Cost of Partisan Politics on Minority 
Diversity of the Federal Bench, 83 IND. LJ. 1423, 1442 (2008). See generally Sherrilyn A. Ifill, 
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commitment to enhancing the situations of minorities, women, and LGBT 
individuals throughout the legal profession, the courts, and society.76 
2. Negative Aspects 
Obama's concerted efforts provided advantages, but some features seem 
to require improvement. A crucial dimension was alacrity: confirmations and 
nominations respecting prolonged openings moved less expeditiously than is 
warranted. For example, in the chief executive's beginning year, he 
appointed a sole Fourth Circuit jurist, although numbers of posts did con-
tinue unfilled.77 The administration could have set priorities more appropri-
ately. The initiative expended on this court undermined actions which 
involved related tribunals. The Second Circuit had a larger percentage of 
vacancies, four 'judicial emergencies" and a nominee in March 2010.78 The 
White House submitted no one for multiple, critical Ninth and D.C. Circuit 
positions until then, while seventeen were open at Obama's Second Inaugu-
ration, more than were at the November 2008 election. 79 However, court 
prioritization is effectively more art than science. The Second Circuit was 
only in a predicament during August 2009, when Sotomayor received confir-
mation and her preeminent colleague assumed senior status. The Ninth Cir-
cuit depends predominantly on twenty-eight active court members and 
substantially on sixteen consistently productive senior jurists, and the D.C. 
R.acial Diversity on the Bench: Beyond Role Models and Public Confidence, 5 7 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 
405 (2000). 
76 Carl Tobias, Dear President Bush: Leaving a Legacy on the Federal Bench, 42 U. RlcH. L. 
REv. 1041, 1048 (2008); see George, supra note 69, at 18-25. For appointment of LGBT 
judges, see Michael Nava, The Servant of All: Humility, Humanity, and Judicial Diversity, 38 
GoLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 175, 192 (2008); Carl Tobias, Considering Gay, Lesbian, Transgender 
and Bisexual Nominees for the Federal Courts, 90 WASH. U. L. REv. 577 (2012); Linda Green-
house, Recuse Me, N.Y. TIMES (May 4, 2011, 9:39 PM), http:/ /opinionator.blogs.nytimes. 
com/2011/05/04/recuse-me/; supra note 64. 
77 Vacancies in the Federal Judiciary, supra note 5 (for 2009); see also supra notes 
41-42, 45, and accompanying text (detailing unfilled posts). 
78 Vacancies in the Federal Judiciary, supra note 5 (for years 2009-2010). Obama 
emphasized the Fourth Circuit's "judicial emergencies," defined as vacancies (1) in which 
adjusted filings per panel exceed 700 or (2) in existence more than eighteen months hav-
ing adjusted filings between 500 and 700. Id. at Judicial Emergencies; see Oliphant, supra 
note 15. 
79 The Tenth Circuit also had two unforeseen 2010 vacancies; both judges resumed 
academic careers. Brooke Adams, Inaction on judges Affecting Utah, SALT LAKE TRIB. (July 
21, 2012, 1:01 AM), http://www.sltrib.com/sltrib/news/54522568-78/courtjudicial-fed-
eral-senate.html.csp; Robert Boczkiewicz, Resignation Turns to Politics, TULSA WoRLD (Dec. 
12, 2009, 5:40 AM), http://www.tulsaworld.com/site/printerfriendlystory.aspx?articleid= 
20091212_14_al_denver882223; see Vacancies in the Federal Judiciary, supra note 5 (for 
years 2008-2012); Savage, supra note 27; Toobin, supra note 39. See generally supra text 
after text at note 67; infra notes 93, 135 and accompanying text. 
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Circuit warrants peculiar attention because the compelling nature of its 
appeals essentially makes the court the nation's second most important.80 
To the extent nominations and confirmations proceeded slowly, the 
president and certain aides bear a modicum of responsibility. Some ideas 
directly explicate the complications with nominations. Reducing partisan-
ship and consulting home state political leaders appeared useful, yet the con-
cepts seemingly imposed temporal expenses and promoted compromises. 
Applying merit commissions, which sought out, investigated, and proposed 
capable lawyers, analyzing the selections closely, denominating terrific picks, 
and negotiating with Obama took remarkable energy. Comprehensive White 
House attempts to collect and synthesize massive input from elected officers, 
coordinate promising activities, cautiously scrutinize prospects, and offer 
strong possibilities drained scarce resources. A trenchant illustration was the 
delicate process for reallocating North Carolina one judgeship earlier 
assigned to South Carolina.81 Pervasive administration consultation and the 
consummate deference accorded senators may have noticeably restricted the 
President's flexibility to mold the courts by nominating and confirming the 
sorts of jurists he preferred.82 Symptomatic was the Maryland and Virginia 
politicians' behavior; the Democratic senators contravened norms when prof-
fering a single aspirant.83 
80 Vacancies in the Federal Judiciary, supra note 5 (for 2010); Carl Tobias, Filling the 
Three openings on the U.S. Court of Appeals Jar the Second Circuit, FINoLAw (Sept. 23, 2009), 
http:/ /writ.news.findlaw.com/commentary/20090923_tobias.html; Carol J. Williams, Rnf>. 
ert R Beez.er Dies; judge on 9th Circuit Court of Appeals, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 3, 2012), http:/ /arti 
cles.latimes.com/2012/apr/03/local/la-me-robert-beezer-20120403. Obama appointed 
no D.C. Circuit judges his first term. See Charlie Savage, Obama Nominates Two Jar Federal 
Appeals Court, N.Y. TIMES Qune 11, 2012), www.nytimes.com/2012/06/12/us/politics/ 
obama-n0minates-halligan-and-srinivasan-to<lc-appeals-court.html; infra note 140. 
81 Carl Tobias, Filling the Fourth Circuit Vacancies, 89 N.C. L. REv. 2161, 2174 (2011); 
Barbara Barrett, Hagan Drove Court Nominations, RALEIGH NEWS & OBSERVER, Nov. 23, 2009, 
at Bl;Jim Morrill, Diaz Confirmed to 4th Circuit, CHARLOTIE OBSERVER, Dec. 19, 2010, at Bl; 
see also Obama Letter, supra note 39 (regarding those circuits); supra text accompanying 
notes 41-42 (same); infra notes 125, 134 (regarding same). 
82 His views on molding the bench are unclear. Dahlia Lithwick, What Does He See in 
Her?, SLATE (May 13, 2010, 6:11 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/ 
jurisprudence/2010/05/what_does_he_see_in_her.html; supra note 72; see also TooBIN, 
supra note 29, at 297-98 (describing unclear views on molding the bench); Ifill, supra note 
61 (describing same); Kendall, supra note 29 (describing same). 
83 Press Release, White House, Office of the Press Sec'y, President Obama Nominates 
Justice Barbara Milano Keenan Jar United States Court of Appeals Jar the Fourth Circuit (Sept. 14, 
2009), available at http://infoweb.newsbank.com/iw-search/we/lnfoWeb?p_action:doc& 
p_topdoc:l&p_docnum:l&p_sort:YMD_date:D&p_product:NewsBank&p_text_direct-0: 
document_id:%28%201343E4FFBA943358%20%29&p_docid: 1343E4FFBA943358&p_ 
theme:aggdocs&p_queryname:l343E4FFBA943358&f_openurl:yes&p_nbid:N50K480E 
MTM2MzAlNTcwNi400DlxMzM6MToxMToxNDEuMTY2LjAuMA&&p_multi:CHOB; 
supra note 35 (regarding Davis nomination); see also Bishop, supra note 32; Tom Jackman, 
Va. judge Nominated Jar Appeals Court, WASH. PosT (Sept. 15, 2009), http:/ /articles.washing 
tonpost.com/2009-09-15/news/36807438_l_courtjudge-appeals-court-circuit-bench; supra 
note 42. 
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Considerable responsibility for dilatory action could be ascribed to the 
GOP, which cooperated less than it might. The party automatically held over 
numerous committee votes a week absent stated reasons, much less persua-
sive contentions, for talented nominees who smoothly earned panel approval 
seven days later,s4 conduct apparently meant to limit confirmations for parti-
san advantage. Sessions candidly acknowledged that the principal Republi-
can tactic basically comprised "delay and conquer" when he answered queries 
implicating stalled nominees: the Ranking Member claimed Democratic 
political figures have a rather effective "strategy, if they get out aggressively 
pushing back, they can create the perception that we're delaying a lot of 
nominees, and so it will be harder for us to delay."S5 
The floor proved the major bottleneck. GOP senators permitted no bal-
lots on six people whom the committee reported across 2009; subsequent 
years were comparatively analogous. They essentially ignored Democratic 
pleas urging cooperation from McConnell and the Republican caucus, but 
the ambitious efficacious White House congressional agenda seemed to 
impair the confirmation voting dynamics.s6 A number of members wielded 
anonymous chamber holds and those lacking convincing arguments for qual-
ified uncontroversial nominees, while the party requested copious debate 
time yet used significantly less and pursued Senate roll call ballots governing 
able designees whom the politicians easily confirmed.s7 The majority some-
times adopted cloture to force votes, although the petitions were relatively 
unprofitable because seeking cloture infuriated the GOP, enhanced delay 
when it required thirty precious debate hours, and concomitantly slowed bal-
lots for numerous additional candidates.SS 
These activities, primarily McConnell's refusal to enter voting concords 
and his colleagues' incessant employment of secret and unexplained holds 
84 See supra notes 42, 52, and accompanying text. See generally infra notes 137-39 and 
accompanying text. 
85 See Dan Friedman, Nomination Battle Affects Un<>f>Posedjudges, NAT'LJ., Oct. 28, 2009, 
http:/ /www.nationaljournal.com/ member I daily I nomination-battle-begins-affecting-un 
opposedjudges-20091028?mrefid=site_search; ALLIANCE FORjusncE,jusTICE CAN'T WAIT 2 
(Oct. 2009), available at http:/ /www.afj.org/judicial-selection/alliance-forjustice-report-
justice-can-t-wait-the-first-ten-months-of-the-obama-administration.pdf; Bernstein, supra 
note 27; supra notes 42, 52-53, and accompanying text. 
86 Sophie Quinton, Fingerpointing on judges, NAT'LJ.,June 21, 2012, available at http:/ I 
www.nationaljournal.com/ member /whitehouse/ classic-fingerpointing-from-white-house-
senate-onjudicial-nominations-20l20620?mrefid=site_search; Savage, supra note 27. The 
GOP agreed to floor votes in September 2009 and few time accords. See supra notes 43-45 
and accompanying text. 
87 Until recently, holds were extraordinarily rare. Aron, supra note 54; supra note 47 
and accompanying text; see Letter from Sen. Claire McCaskill to Sen. Harry Reid and Sen. 
Mitch McConnell (Apr. 22, 2010); infra note 142. For debate times and roll call votes, see 
supra note 46 and accompanying text; see also Letter, supra note 34 (listing debate times 
and roll call votes). 
88 See supra notes 43-48, 53, 56, 66, and accompanying text; see also SENATE RULE 22 
(2012); Kendall, supra note 58; supra notes 48-52, 54-55, and accompanying text; infra 
notes 127-28, 140, and accompanying text. 
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for impressive noncontroversial picks, had several consequences.89 The 
behavior profoundly lengthened dilatory appointments, mandating cloture 
and consuming floor time, abolished civility's remnants, and correspondingly 
exacerbated the already inflamed confirmation wars. Numbers of endeavors 
assessed made nominees suspend careers, prevented superior prospects from 
thinking about bench service, deprived many circuits of judicial resources 
which they desperately required, impeding quick, economical, and fair case 
disposition and increasing pressure on sitting jurists, and lessened public 
regard for court selection and each government branch. 
Fewer judges won confirmation during Obama's initial year than under 
other presidents since the 1960s, while appointments have demanded seven 
months, but the confirmation and nomination processes could have 
improved later.90 Emblematic are Clinton's appointing Justice Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg and seven circuit jurists and choosing twenty-one more possibilities 
in 1993, and George W. Bush's 2001 confirmation of six appeals court mem-
bers and proposal of twenty-nine more nominees, statistical parameters 
which dramatically rose the succeeding year.91 
Conditions that Obama and the chamber lacked material ability to con-
trol actually explain delayed confirmations and nominations. Crucial was 
promptly filling Justice Souter's vacancy, an initiative that preempted lower 
court action over months; similar necessity propelled the effort to replace 
Justice Stevens.92 The president incurred the critical "start-up" expenses for 
89 158 CoNG. REc. S8376 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 2012) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy); 
Carl Tobias, A Fourth Circuit Photograph, 45 WAKE FoREsT L. REv. 1373 (2010); Tobias, supra 
note 81; Andrew Cohen, In Pennsylvania, the Human Costs of judicial Confirmation Delays, 
ATLANTIC (Sept. 10, 2012 3:38 P.M.), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/ 
09 I in-pennsylvania-the-human-costs-of judicial-confirmation-delays/261862/; Todd Ruger, 
Nominees Are Living on Hold: Caught in a Political Game, judicial Candidates Get Used to Waiting, 
NAT'L L. J., Dec. 17, 2012, available atwww.dailyreportonline.com/Pub/ ArticleDROjsp?id= 
1355684605200&siretom=20130231201307. 
90 156 CoNG. REc. S904, supra note 43 (regarding the fewer jurists). For times, see 158 
CONG. REc. S5005 (daily ed. July 16, 2012) (statement of Sen. Charles Grassley); Ari 
Berman, Why the Supreme Court Matters, NATION (Apr. 11, 2012), http://www.thenation. 
com/article/167350/why-supreme-court-matters; Doug Kendall, The 200-Day Club, SLATE 
(Sept. 27, 2012, 4:11 PM), http:/ /www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurispru 
dence/2012/09/judicial_confirmation_process_it_takes_more_than_200_days_to_join_ 
the_federal_bench_.html; Richard Wolf, Obama Determined to Fill Federal judgeships, USA 
TODAY (Nov. 29, 2012, 5:19 PM), http:/ /www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2012/ 
ll/28/obama-republicans-judges-senate/1715357/. But see 158 CoNG. REc. S6495 (daily 
ed. Sept. 20, 2012) (statement of Sen. Mitch McConnell). 
91 Vacancies in the Federal Judiciary, supra note 5 (for years 1993-1994 & 2001-2002); 
see also supra notes 14-26; infra note 92. 
92 2010 circuit activity was greater. 156 CoNG. REc. S6991 (2010); supra note 60 and 
accompanying text; see supra text accompanying note 37. The year 2009 was like 1993 
when Ginsburg replaced Justice Byron White; her approval took less time due to consulta-
tion. Linda Greenhouse, Senate, 96-3, Easily Affirms judge Ginsburg as a justice, N.Y. TIMES 
(Aug. 4, 1993), http://www.nytimes.com/1993/08/04/us/senate-96-3-easily-affirms-judge-
ginsburg-as-ajustice.html; see also ORRIN HATCH, SQUARE PEG CONFESSIONS OF A CITIZEN 
SENATOR 179 (2003); Stras & Scott, supra note 7, at 1902-04. 
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properly instituting a government. During his beginning year and much of 
the next, members neglected to confirm sufficient upper-echelon DOJ 
officers, particularly for OLP.93 Attacking myriad intractable complications, 
especially the recession, the Iraq and Afghanistan circumstances, and the 
Guantanamo situation, which previous chief executives bequeathed, also con-
sumed huge resources.94 
Appointing nominees who serve on courts appears to impose certain 
detriments, even while the idea yields multiple advantages, namely the com-
parative ease of tracking important qualifications and conveying applicable 
experience. For instance, critics question the advisability of effectively con-
verting the appellate bench into a "career judiciary" like that most European 
nations have adopted.95 Commentators rely upon the American convention 
which plucks jurists from a multitude of sources, including the plaintiff and 
defense civil bars, federal and state criminal practitioners, and legal scholars; 
they contribute wide-ranging perspectives and skills. A few expert critics 
inquire whether the desire of numerous judges to be elevated may not under-
cut independence or wonder about mounting bureaucratization.96 
93 Goldman et al., supra note 27, at 264-66; Leahy statement, supra note 43; Peter 
Baker, Obama's Team is Lacking Most of Its Top Players, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 24, 2009), http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2009/08/24/us/politics/24confirm.html; see Wil S. Hylton, Hope. 
Change. Reality., GENTLEMEN'S Q. (Dec. 2010), http://www.gq.com/news-politics/politics/ 
201012/ eric-holder-attorney-general-rahm-emanuel-white-house-elections; Al Kamen, The 
Judicial Waiting Game, WASH. PosT (Aug. 4, 2010); Ed O'Keefe, Obama Criticizes Holds Placed 
on his Nominees, WASH. PosT (Feb. 4, 2010), http:/ /articles.washingtonpost.com/2010-02-
04/politics/36788060_l_confirmation-votes-martha-njohnson-president-obama; Seth 
Stern, Bench-C/,earing Brawl, C.Q. WEEKLY, Sept. 27, 2010, at 2212. 
94 See Peter Baker, Could Afghanistan Become Obama's Vietnam?, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 22, 
2009), http:/ /www.nytimes.com/2009/08/23/weekinreview/23baker.html; Thomas L. 
Friedman, Op-Ed, Finishing Our Work, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 4, 2008), http:/ /www.nytimes. 
com/2008/ll/05/opinion/05friedman.html; Anne E. Kornblut, Obama Declares That Com-
bat In Iraq is Over, WASH. PosT (Sept. 1, 2010), http:/ /www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/ 
content/article/2010/08/31/ / AR2010083104496.html; Mark Landler, Obama Signs Pact in 
Kabul, Turning Page in Afghan War, N.Y. TIMES (May 1, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2012/05 I 02/ world/ asia/ obama-lands-in-kabul-0n-unannounced-visit.html. 
95 For helpful assessment of a "career judiciary," see supra note 62. See generally Russell 
Wheeler, Changing Backgrounds of U.S. District judges: Likely Causes and Possib/,e Implications, 
93 JUDICATURE 140 (2010); Ashby Jones, Scalia in Mississippi: Stop With the Judges, Already!, 
WALL ST.j. (Jan. 5, 2010, 1:37 P.M.), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2010/01/05/scalia-in-mis-
sissippi-stop-with-thejudges-already; The Reliable Source, A Truly Exclusive Washington 
Party: Antonin Scalia Hosts Justices to Toast New Henry Friendly Bio, WASH. PosT (May 1, 2012), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/ reliable-source/ post/ a-truly-exclusive-washington-
party-an tonin-scalia-hosts-justices-to-toast-new-henry-friendly-bio /2012/ 04/ 30 / gl QAR2vY 
sT_blog.html. 
96 POSNER, supra note 34, at 139-59; see also JONATHAN MATTHEW CoHEN, INSIDE APPEL-
LATE CouRTS 1-19 (2002); Owen M. Fiss, The Bureaucratization ofthejudiciary, 92YALE L.J. 
1442 ( 1983); Alvin B. Rubin, Bureaucratization of the Federal Courts: The Tension Between Justice 
and Efficiency, 55 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 648 (1980); Katherine A. Helm & Joel Cohen, Don't 
Exclude Academics from the Federal Judiciary, LAW.COM (Sept. 6, 2011), http://www.law.com/ 
jsp/ articleJsp?id= 12025134 72093&Don t_Exclude_Academics_From_the_F ederal_Judiciary 
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Commentators emphasize related attributes that confirmees and nomi-
nees possess. Critics ask why merely one candidate is thirty-nine and the 
cohort averages fifty-five, contending GOP appointment of younger jurists 
supplies much beneficial circuit longevity and excellent picks when Supreme 
Court Justices decide to retire.97 Observers ponder the ideological view-
points which some confirmees and prospects hold, deeming them excessively 
liberal or conservative. Astute commentators urge greater balance, intimat-
ing that ample resistance even to centrists, like Judges Davis and Hamilton, 
shows that compromise on ideology has been a less productive strategy while 
Republican presidents assiduously suggested conservative appeals court 
jurists. 98 
This appointments evaluation concludes that Obama and the chamber 
implemented many efficacious procedures which should promote accom-
plished judges' confirmations. However, the analysis determines that nomi-
nees might be canvassed with additional speed, in particular given the 
voluminous openings. The last Part, thus, carefully assesses practices for 
swiftly considering numbers of possibilities submitted and curbing gridlock. 
Ill. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PROMPTLY FILLING THE APPELlATE VACANCIES 
A. The Executive and the Senate 
Obama and both parties' senators effectuated manifold crucial policies 
and should keep applying the constructs and other valuable ideas to the cir-
cuit process and the numerous specific vacant posts.99 The chief executive 
and the Senate conscientiously identified and handled concerns raised by 
acute politicization. For example, Obama consciously acted in ways that 
&slretum=2013113211939. Many Obama appointees do not increase the circuit bench's 
experiential diversity. 
97 Berman, supra note 90; see George, supra note 69, at 16, 21; Pamela S. Karlan, Empty 
Benches, BosTON REv. (Sept./Oct. 2012), http://www.bostonreview.net/BR37.5/pamela_s_ 
karlan_federal_courts_vacancies_obama.php; Mark Walsh, Youth Will Out: No Matter Who 
Wins, SCOTUS Nominees Will Get Younger, A.B.A. ]., Aug. 2012, at 19; Jamelle Bouie, How 
Obama Has jeopardized the Future of Liberalism, WASH. PosT. (Oct. 9, 2012, 3:28 PM), http:/ I 
www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/plum-line/post/how-obama-hasjeopardized-the-future-
of-liberalism/2012/10/09 /bec545de-l 225-l l e2-9a39-lf5a7f6fe945_blog.html. 
98 For balance, see Fontana, supra note 48; Ifill, supra note 61; supra text accompany-
ing notes 52-54, 71-73, 83. For GOP appointees, see Tobias, supra note 76, at 1045; Char-
lie Savage, Appea/,s Court Pushed to Right fry Bush Choices, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 28, 2008), http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2008/10/29/us/29judges.html; supra text accompanying note 73. A 
few say ethnic and gender diversity's emphasis erodes merit and other diversity, ideas the 
"Wise Latina" issue shows. Hon. Sonia Sotomayor, A Latina judge's Voice, 13 BERKELEY LA 
RAZA LJ. 87 (2002). See generally SONIA SOTOMAYER, Mv BELOVED CouNTRY (2013); Scherer, 
supra note 30, at 591. 
99 The best remedy may be enough new positions to seat all judges now authorized. 
Tobias, supra note 1, at 569. Others only limit irreducible time restraints. For many ideas, 
see MANN & ORNSTEIN, supra note 47; Goldman et al., supra note 27; Tuan Samahon, The 
Judicial Vesting Option: Opting Out of Nomination and Advice and Consent, 67 OHIO ST. LJ. 783 
(2006); Tobias, supra note l, at 552-73. 
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essentially depoliticized fundamental constituents of selection.100 The White 
House and congressional leaders attempted to coordinate and innovate, rec-
oncile conflicting views, predict and creatively mediate stubborn disputes, 101 
and cease or ameliorate conduct found not profitable. 102 Appointments offi-
cials will most easily consolidate the best approaches, if the chief executive, 
legislators, and staff continue assertive communications prior and subse-
quent to nominations. 
Politicians in jurisdictions that encountered unoccupied seats cooper-
ated with the President and a multitude of colleagues respecting substantial 
issues, especially directly assuming principal responsibility to send potential 
nominees. 103 When openings in fact materialized, lawmakers delineated sev-
eral competent picks, encompassing the impressive administration nomi-
nees.104 Officers established commissions which recommended aspirants, 
yet developing some panels stalled confirmations, although that may be one 
fixed cost in a nascent presidency and with concomitantly altered Senate 
composition. Therefore, the political figures might survey numbers of analo-
gous committees prescribed earlier and, when indicated, recalibrate endeav-
ors by improving transparency while effectively safeguarding privacy. 
Constructive illustrations are the entities that Wisconsin officials sponsored 
the past third century and California Senators Dianne Feinstein (D) and Bar-
bara Boxer (D) invoked over George W. Bush's tenure. 105 The commissions 
essentially improve appointments for circuits wrestling with multiple empty 
positions and combat sustained deadlocks, as the panels help galvanize 
consensus. 106 
100 See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text. See generally supra notes 27-34 and 
accompanying text. 
101 For example, Democrats clarified they would assume the lead when Texas senators 
kept the Bush panel. See supra note 33; see also H. Thomas Wells Jr., No Time for Tension, No 
Room for Rancor, AB.A. J., Nov. 2008, at 94. 
102 When the GOP opposed a quick hearing, Leahy held a second, while Sessions devi-
ated from tradition by agreeing to one hearing for two nominees. See supra text accompa-
nying notes 40-41; see also Toobin, supra note 4. 
103 See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text. See generally supra note 101 and 
accompanying text. 
104 See supra notes 31-32, 61-64, 68, and accompanying text. But see supra text accom-
panying notes 31, 83. 
105 California kept them; Wisconsin's vets applicants from whom senators pick. See 
supra note 31; Senate Judiciary Comm., Exec. Business Mtg., Feb. 4, 2010 (statements of 
Sens. Russ Feingold and Dianne Feinstein); Editorial, Step Aside, Senator, MILWAUKEE]. SEN-
TINEL (July 19, 20ll), http://wwwJsonline.com/news/opinion/125847338.html. A panel 
like President Jimmy Carter's may warrant evaluation. See LARRv BERKSON & SusAN CAR-
BON, THE UNITED STATES CIRCUIT JUDGE NOMINATING COMMISSION (1980). 
106 If the ideas above fail, Obama and senators must redouble efforts to end logjams. 
Mark Hansen, Logjam, A.B.A. J., June 2008, at 38; Jonathan Bernstein, Mitch McConnell's 
Choice: justice Delayed, and Delayed, and Delayed, WASH. PosT (June 14, 2012, 1:09 P.M.), 
http:/ /www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/plum-line/post/mitch-mcconnells-choicejustice-
delayed-and-delayed-and-delayed/2012/06/l 4/ gJQA VEMjcV _blog.html; Paul Kane, Reid 
Calls for Ending "Gridlock" But Pledges Senate Rules Changes if GOP Tries to Obstruct Obama 's 
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Sharp filing increases after 1990, when the most recent comprehensive 
judgeships act passed, dictated the U.S. Judicial Conference request to 
authorize a dozen new slots. 107 Because the courts' policymaking arm 
grounds suggestions regarding more posts on conservative work and case 
load estimates and the circuits have dire needs for additional jurists who rem-
edy docket crises, Obama and Congress must adopt thorough legislation.108 
Supplemental judgeships could prove rather inconsequential, should 
gridlock persist. 109 
Despite the benefits shown, the procedures used were not entirely suc-
cessful. Thus, the President and officers may want to concurrently scrutinize 
various practices which the White House and the lawmakers instituted, refine 
or delete less effective techniques, if necessary, closely analyze sound con-
cepts previously employed, and cautiously screen, while perhaps applying, 
innovative untested solutions. 
B. The Executive 
The last three presidents have similar responsibility for the present diffi-
culties.110 Obama enunciated broad, critical goals and swiftly implemented 
efficacious policies which realized commendable objectives and should in 
essence carefully proceed as he started.111 This White House considered 
merit the polestar, tendered very qualified diverse nominees, and stream-
lined initiatives by restoring pre-submission ABA examinations which defi-
nitely illuminate confirmations and can avoid embarrassment. 112 Obama 
Tenn, WASH. PosT (Nov. 7, 2012), http:/ /articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-11-07 /polit-
ics/35503993_l_reid-filibuster-rules-boehner. More drastic ideas, namely "trades," may 
merit use. Infra note 126. 
107 U.S.JuDICIAL CoNF., REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONF. OF THE U.S. 
20 (Mar. 15, 2011); seeS.1653, 112th Cong. (2011); S.1014, 112th Cong. (2011); The Federal 
judgeships Act of 2009: Hearing on S.1653 Before the S. Comm. on the judiciary, lllth Cong. 
(2009); 156 CoNG. REc. S904, supra note 43; Carl Tobias, Congress and the Pending Compre-
hensive judgeships Legislation, FINDLAW (Sept. 30, 2009), http:/ /writ.news.findlaw.com/com-
mentary/20090930_tobias.html. . 
108 Tobias, supra note 9, at 748; GoRDON BERMANT ET AL., FED. Juo1cIAL CTR., IMPOSING 
A MORATORIUM ON THE NUMBER OF fEDERALjUDGES: ANALYSIS OF ARGUMENTS AND IMPLICA-
TIONS (1993); see also Tobias, supra note 76, at 1045, 1052 (appeals and workloads). But see 
Robert Iafolla, GOP Victory Scrambles the Judiciary Agenda, L.A. DAILY J., Jan. 21, 2010; infra 
note 149. 
109 E.g., supra notes 42, 64, 83-90, and accompanying text; see supra notes 12-26 and 
accompanying text. 
110 See supra notes 14-26 and accompanying text. Obama might want to solicit effica-
cious guidance from officials who have been responsible for judicial selection in earlier 
administrations. Tobias, supra note 76, at 1051. 
111 However, Obama might review and refine or eliminate, as warranted, his ideas, ana-
lyze earlier tools, and consider untested ones, see supra paragraph after text accompanying 
note 109, and announce the goals in a national forum; this should increase transparency 
and inform participants in the process and citizens, see Tobias, supra note 76, at 1049. 
112 See supra notes 30, 60-64, and accompanying text; see also supra text accompanying 
notes 10, 20, 29. 
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must keep retaining dominant responsibility for nominations and continue 
deferring to politicians, when appropriate, cultivating home state legislators 
and capitalizing on their informative guidance, accommodating cooperative 
Republicans, 113 elevating jurists, and forecasting High Court vacancies. 114 
The President should also keep providing sufficient able people of color, 
women, and LGBT designees the committee smoothly reviews at a pace that 
insures efficient chamber investigation, 115 and continue solicitude for Demo-
cratic party leaders and corresponding GOP analogues. However, controver-
sial executive branch recess appointments in 2012 drastically undermined 
the sensitively calibrated White House activities, precipitating scathing reac-
tions by minority party senators.116 
113 GOP votes reflect these ideas. Todd Ruger, The Senate's Strang/,ehold, NAT 0 L LJ., 
(Oct. 1, 2012), http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJJsp?id=l202573089819&The_ 
Senates_stranglehold; David Stout, Sotomayor Gets 9 G.O.P. Votes, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 6, 2009, 
12:56 PM), http:/ I thecaucus. blogs.nytimes.com/2009 /08/06/ sotomayor-gets-9-gop-votes 
(updated Aug. 6, 2009, 1:44 PM); see supra text accompanying notes 45-46, 56; infra note 
123. Obama's cost free, constructive consultation must continue. See supra notes 31-33 
and accompanying text. 
114 Jeffrey Toobin, After Stevens: What Will the Supreme Court Be Like Without Its Liberal 
Leader?, NEW YORKER (Mar. 22, 2010), http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2010/03/ 
22/100322fa_fact_toobin; see Fontana, supra note 48; Lisa Mascaro, Jacqueline H. Nguyen of 
L.A Confirmed to U.S. 9th Circuit Court, L.A. TIMES (May 7, 2012), http://articles.Jatimes. 
com/2012/may/07 /nation/la-na-nguyen-20120508 (elevating Obama's nominee); Jeffrey 
Rosen, Op-Ed., Barack Obama Supreme Court justice, WASH. PosT (Feb. 21, 2010), arti-
cles. washingtonpost.com/2010-02-21Iopinions/36783133-1-presiden t-obama-barack-
obama-supreme-court (discussing the qualities of President Obama and their relation to 
the Supreme Court); supra notes 37, 61-64, 68, 92, and accompanying text. 
115 Kendall, supra note 58; supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text; see 156 CONG. 
REc. S904, supra note 43; Letter from Prof. Bruce Ackerman et al., supra note 34. In 2009, 
Obama tapped slowly. Todd Ruger, judicial Restraint, NAT 0 L LJ. (May 14, 2012), http:// 
www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJJsp?id=l202553268915&Judicial_restraint. The pace 
did quicken, as Steve Six shows. Press Release, White House, Office of Press Sec'y, President 
Obama Nominates Steve Six to United States Circuit Court (Mar. 9, 2011), availab/,e at http:/ I 
www.whitehouse.gov I the-press-office/2011I03 I 09 I president-o bama-nominates-steve-six-
united-states-circuit-court; Ruger, supra note 113; see Jonathan Bernstein, Op-Ed., Fill Those 
judicial Vacancies!, WASH. PosT (May 21, 2012, 3:19 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
biogs/ plum-line/ post/ fill-thosejudicial-vacancies/2012/05 /21 / gl QAZcjwfU _blog.html. 
116 See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text; supra notes 40-41; infra notes 
136-42. But see supra text accompanying notes 42-56 (discussing appointments made). 
For recess appointments, see Noel Canning v. NLRB, 705 F. 3d 490 (D.C. Cir. 2013); Law-
fulness of Recess Appointments During a Recess of the Senate Notwithstanding Periodic Pro Forma 
Sessions, 36 OP. O.L.C. 1 (2012); Charlie Savage, Obama Tempts Fight Over Recess Appoint-
ments, N.Y. TIMES Qan. 4, 2012, 5:41 PM), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/0l/ 
04/obama-tempts-fight-over-recess-appointments/; Jonathan Weisman, Republican Vow of 
Revenge Falls Short, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 9, 2012, 3:29 PM), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes. 
com/2012/02/09 / senate-g-o-p-vowed-to-oppose-all-obama-choices-but-nominee-gets-bipar-
tisan-confirmation; George F. Will, Op. Ed., Obama's Se/,ective Defense of the Constitution, 
WASH. PoST (Oct 10, 2012), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-10-10/opinions/ 
35498394_l_recess-appointments-presidential-appointments-vacancies; infra note 128. 
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Obama concomitantly pursued special efforts to profoundly improve 
ethnic, gender, and sexual-orientation diversity, which his confirmations and 
nominations consistently represent,11 7 and must keep widening that diver-
sity,118 as it can yield the advantages recounted. 119 Obama's circuit appoin-
tees and nominees could enlarge ideological diversity; he might weigh 
augmenting this because Republican presidents sent numerous conservatives 
and enhanced balance is warranted. 120 Obama may effectively counter asser-
tions that confirmees and nominees hold comparatively liberal viewpoints by 
denominating moderates. Insofar as the prospects can spark efficacious 
interest group resistance and deleterious criticisms which resemble those 
both parties fired at each other's White Houses, crucially slowing the process 
and driving rejections, he could assess somewhat conservative aspirants or 
correspondingly be pragmatic about how this opposition can detrimentally 
affect selection. 121 These complications had accentuated relevance the last 
Congress, given Democrats' reduced numbers and the machinations, which 
include procedural stalling, that normally constrict appointments over presi-
dential election years. Indeed, McConnell ceased entering appellate nomi-
nee voting concords in June, and the chamber adjourned without casting 
ballots on more.122 Notwithstanding the larger Democratic majority and 
117 See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text. Officials have proposed numerous 
diverse prospects, supra text accompanying note 32, as has Obama, supra text accompany-
ing note 64; see Goldman, supra note 9 (recounting presidential records since Nixon). 
118 He may review and refine his ideas and assess effective prior ones. Carter used 
panels, and Presidents George H.W. Bush and Clinton asked senators to suggest many 
strong women. See Carl Tobias, More Women Named Federal judges, 43 FLA. L. REv. 4 77, 
479-80 (1991) (discussing President Bush's efforts to suggest more strong women); Neil A. 
Lewis, Unmaking the G.O.P. Court Legacy, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 23, 1993), http://www.nytimes. 
com/1993/08/23/us/ unmaking-the-gop-court-legacy.html (discussing President Clinton's 
efforts to suggest more strong women); supra note 105 (discussing President Carter's use 
of panels to suggest more strong women); see also supra paragraph after text accompanying 
note 109. 
119 See supra notes 69-76 and accompanying text. See generally supra notes 30-33 and 
accompanying text. But see supra note 98 (discussing "erosion" of merits). 
120 See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 97-98 and accom-
panying text. 
121 Carl Hulse, G.O.P. Blocks judicial Nominee in a Sign of Battles to Come, N.Y. TIMES (May 
19, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/20/us/politics/20congress.html; Neil A. 
Lewis, Bush judicial Choice Imperiled by Refusal to Release Papers, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 27, 2002), 
http:/ /www.nytimes.com/ 2002/ 09 /27 / us/bushjudicial-choice-imperiled-by-refusal-to-
release-papers.h tml?ref=neilalewis; see GERHARDT, supra note 11, at 217-29; NANCY 
SCHERER, SCORING POINTS: POLITICIANS, ACTIVISTS, AND THE APPOINTMENT PROCESS 4-10 
(2005). 
122 158 CoNG. REc. S5642 (daily ed. July 30, 2012) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy); 
RusSELL WHEELER, JUDICIAL CONFIRMATIONS: WHAT THURMOND RuLE?, BROOKINGS INST. 
( 2012), available at http:/ /www.brookings.edu/ research/ papers/2012/03/judicial-
wheeler; Letter from Sen. Mitch McConnell to Bill Robinson, ABA President, (June 25, 
2012); Carl Tobias, Senate Should Not Invoke "Thurmond Rule" to Block Kayatta Nomination, 
THE HILL (Aug. 14, 2012), http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/judicial/243511-sen-
ate-should-not-invoke-thurmond-rule-to-block-kayatta-nomination; infra note 135; see also 
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Obama's second victory, the notions retain pertinence. The chief executive 
might also contemplate increasing diversity with respect to experience and 
age; Obama could name and confirm many strong attorneys who practice 
civil and criminal law, scholars, and younger candidates. 123 
Another cogent idea would be rigorously proffering additional nomina-
tions the GOP can support. Prominent examples are Circuit Judges Diaz, 
Murguia, and Stranch, possibilities officials in their jurisdictions favored. 124 
The White House should consider proposing greater numbers of Republican 
appointees like Judge Henry Floyd whom the chief executive tapped after 
consulting home state officers and perhaps suggest more, capable individuals 
with party affiliations. 125 Those notions may be effective for confirmations 
involving appeals courts, which have several protracted vacancies and gargan-
tuan dockets, or encompass jurisdictions, namely Idaho, Kansas, Texas and 
Utah, with two GOP senators. 126 
The President should continue following measured, nuanced policies, as 
mistakes erode credibility and can narrow appointments. Obama, whose 
touchstone is bipartisanship, must keep adopting conciliatory endeavors. 
Illustrative are robust consultation and his exceptional nominees; the submis-
sions' competence, mainstream points of view, and diverse backgrounds 
show why few have provoked significant controversy. If these actions lack 
Carl Tobias, Filling the judicial Vacancies in a Presidential Election Year, 46 U. RicH. L. REv. 985 
(2012). 
123 Fontana, supra note 48; David G. Savage, Senate judicial Confirmations Skip 2 California 
Nominees, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 20, 2010), http://articles.Jatimes.com/2010/dec/20/nation/la-
na-senatejudges-20101221; Micah Schwartzman, Not Getting Any Younger, SI.ATE (May 26, 
2011), http:/ /www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2011/05/ 
not_getting_any_younger.html; Carol J. Williams, 9th Circuit Candidate's Career Marked by 
Rapid Ascent, Ranging 'Roles, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 9, 2010), http://articles.Jatimes.com/2010/ 
mar/09/local/la-me-goodwin-liu9-2010mar09; see Wheeler, supra note 95; supra notes 
61-62, 64, 96-98, and accompanying text. 
124 Bill Theobald, NashviUe Attorneys Appointment to U.S. Appeals Court is Confirmed, THE 
TENNESSEAN (Sept. 14, 2010), http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/tennessean/access/21373616 
21.html?FMT=ABS&FMTS=ABS:FT&type=current&date=Sep+l4%2C+2010&author=Bill& 
pub=The+Tennessean&edition=&startpage=n%2Fa&desc=Nashville+attorney%27s+ap 
pointment+to+U.S.+appeals+court+is+confirmed; supra note 57; infra note 132 and accom-
panying text; see supra text accompanying note 113; infra notes 133-35. 
125 157 CoNG. REc. S6027 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 20ll);James Rosen, Obama Nominates S.C. 
Federal judge to Appellate Court, McCLATCHY WASH. BuREAu (Jan. 27, 2011, 11:06 AM) www. 
mcclatchydc.com/2011/01 /27 /v-print/l 07597 I obama-nominates-sc-federaljudge. html.; 
infra note 134. Quintessential is Sotomayor whom George H.W. Bush first chose. Neil A. 
Lewis, After Delay, Senate Approves Judge for Court In New York, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 3, 1998), 
http:/ /www.nytimes.com/ 1998/ 10 I 03/ nyregion/ after-delay-senate-approvesjudge-for-
court-in-new-york.h tml?ref=neilalewis; see Tobias, supra note 9, at 770-71. 
126 See infra text accompanying notes 133-35. For lengthy vacancies, see Tobias, supra 
note 81. For courts with long openings and many cases in states where officials differ, 
compromises or "trades" may work, as Georgia suggests. Bill Rankin, Vote Sets Stage for 
Changes on the Bench, ATLANTA]. CoNsT., Oct. 21, 2012, at IA. Trades spark controversy. 
143 CoNG. REc. S2541 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1997) (statement of Sen. Joe Biden); see 
GERHARDT, supra note 11, at 157-63. 
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efficacy because Republicans do not cooperate, administration personnel 
ought to contemplate applying relatively confrontational alternatives. For 
instance, should the GOP continue delaying numerous approval votes, the 
chief executive might use the bully pulpit in embarrassing the officials and 
holding senators publicly responsible, force confirmations by taking the divi-
sive issue to the nation, or make unfilled seats a prominent election year 
question. 127 Substantially analogous would be proffering skilled consensus 
nominees for all present court openings and selectively instituting circuit 
recess appointments; both devices could leverage Republicans through pub-
licizing and dramatizing how chronic vacancies eviscerate justice .128 
C. The Senate 
The Senate must adopt cooperative practices, as the chamber shares 
responsibility with the past three administrations for the deteriorating condi-
tion of judicial selection and the numerous current openings. The GOP may 
want to remember that Democrats helped approve greater numbers of jurists 
when it controlled the presidency129 and citizens might now blame Republi-
cans for severely prolonged vacancies.HID Accordingly, GOP members essen-
tially need to be less confrontational. The senators may afford candid advice, 
if consulted; employ incisive debates, not filibusters; vote more expeditiously 
on accomplished centrist nominees and Bush confirmees Obama proposes; 
and recommend stellar choices when his prove unacceptable.131 
127 158 CoNG. REc. S1065 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 2012); Press Release, White House, Office 
of the Press Sec'y, President Obama Renominates Thirty-Three to Federal Judgeships, (Jan. 3, 
2013) available at http:/ /www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/01/03/president-
obama-re-nominates-thirty-three-federaljudgeships; 158 CoNG. REc. S8376, supra note 89; 
Jonathan Bernstein, Op-Ed., Will Obama Push for Judicial Confirmations this Fall?, WASH. PosT 
(Aug. 31, 2011), http:/ /www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/plum-line/post/will-obama-push-
forjudicial-confirmations-this-fall/2011I08/ 31 I gIQARwd5rJ_blog.html; Linda Green-
house, Op-Ed., Rock Bottom, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 14, 2011), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes. 
corn/2011/12/14/rock-bottom/. The GOP has mastered these ideas. Stras & Scott, supra 
note 7, at 1902-06; Tobias, supra note 9, at 772; Ruger, supra note 113. 
128 Unless the situation substantially worsens, Obama should not recess appoint judges, 
as many legal and political concerns explain its rare use. U.S. CoNST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3; see 
Evans v. Stephens, 387 F.3d 1220 (11th Cir. 2004); United States v. Woodley, 751F.2d1008 
(9th Cir. 1985); William Ty Mayton, Recess Appointments and an Independent judiciary, 20 
CONST. COMMENT. 515 (2004); sources cited supra note 116. George W. Bush used similar 
ideas, such as renominating controversial picks, to press Democrats, but some concepts 
Jack efficacy and Obama should eschew them. See, e.g., Tobias, supra note 76, at 1052-54; 
Lewis, supra note 37; Toobin, supra note 4. 
129 See Tobias, supra note 9, at 756-57. See generally Hartley, supra note 12. But see 
Hatch, supra note 8, at 1035-40 (discussing constitutional ways to appoint). 
130 See supra notes 22, 24-26; see also Jack Newfield, The Right 's judicial juggernaut, THE 
NATION (Oct. 7, 2002), http:/ /www.thenation.com/article/rights-judicialjuggernaut#. 
But see 158 CoNG. REc. S5647-49 (statements of Sens. Chuck Grassley & Mitch McConnell) 
(daily ed. July 30, 2012). 
131 Bush, Obama, and others posit ideas to speed selection. Some, such as requiring 
judges to give earlier notice of intent to assume senior status and rigid dates for specific 
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Illustrations abound the last two congresses. Arizona Senators John 
McCain (R) and Jon Kyl (R) personally supported nomination of Judge 
Murguia, energetically assisting the fine pick to navigate the gauntlet.132 
Utah Senator Hatch championed Professor Scott Matheson and deftly reas-
sured Kyl, allaying concerns about the nominee's constitutional principles, 
which seemingly persuaded the Arizonan to favor the superb prospect. 133 
Cooperation implicating Senators Lindsey Graham (R) and Jim DeMint (R) 
and Representative James Clyburn (D), active preeminent South Carolina 
leaders, underlay their proffer, and White House tender, of very competent 
Bush appointee Floyd, who easily captured approval. 134 In contrast, for egre-
gious scenarios-particularly those mirroring the Oklahoma appeals court 
vacancy, where GOP Senators James Inhofe and Tom Coburn apparently 
enjoyed nominal consultation-the President's staff might, and ultimately 
did, readjust, commencing dialogue and canvassing Republican attorneys or 
names concomitantly deemed preferable by Inhofe and Coburn, who 
seemed receptive to overtures.135 
Judiciary panel evaluations have minimally frustrated confirmations. 
Democrats generously accommodated innumerable GOP requests. There 
phases, are infeasible or violate traditions. Exec. Order No. 13,300, 68 Fed. Reg. 25,807 
(May 9, 2003); S. Res. 327, 108th Cong. (2004) (enacted); Bermant et al., supra note l; 
Mike Allen & Arny Goldstein, Bush Has Plan to Speed judicial Confirmations, WASH. PosT, Oct. 
31, 2002, at A21; Fontana, supra note 33; Paul Kane, State of the Union Proposals: What Might 
Pass?, WASH. PosT Oan. 25, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/state-0f-the-
union-proposals-what-might-pass/2012/01/25/gIQAQhsVRQ_story.html; see supra notes 
46, 57, 124-26; infra note 142 and accompanying text. 
132 Hearing Before the Senate judiciary Comm. on Mary Murguia to be a U.S. Circititjudge for 
the Ninth Circuit, lllth Cong. (2010); 156 CONG. REc. Sl0,986 (daily ed. Dec. 22, 2010); see 
158 CONG. REc. S3947 (daily ed. June 12, 2012) (showing Arizona senators' similar treat-
ment of Arizona Supreme Court Justice Andrew Hurwitz). 
133 Senate Judiciary Comm., Exec. Business Mtg., June 10, 2010; see Thomas Burr, Scott 
Matheson fr. OK'dfor Appeals Court Position, SALT LAKE TRIB. (Dec. 25, 2010), http:/ /archive. 
sltrib.com/article.php?id=l2707607&itype=storyID; Thomas Burr, Scott Matheson Named to 
10th Circuit Appellate Court, SALT LAKE TRIB. (Mar. 3, 2010), http://www.sltrib.com/ 
ci_l4506179; Letter from Judge Michael McConnell, Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, to 
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was a hearing for one nominee the entire final month during the last Con-
gress's initial session and another convened respecting Liu, even though the 
party had comprehensively interrogated the nominee with a daunting mara-
thon session, and returned Liu to the chief executive, the identical year. 136 
Nevertheless, the minority assiduously kept holding over numerous promi-
nent submissions absent explanations, producing short confirmation delays. 
Therefore, Republicans must decrease the procedure's invocation while seek-
ing additional time only when clearly necessary. An example was a pragmatic 
request in the 112th Senate's earliest meeting propounded by Senator 
Charles Grassley (R-Iowa) to delay numbers of votes, which arguably pro-
vided Senator Mike Lee (R-Utah), a new member, rather effective opportuni-
ties for treating candidates. 137 
If the panel dramatically slows processing, senators possess numerous 
ways to speed assessment. The committee may expand ballots with relatively 
truncated analysis, one idea which Hatch, the ex-Chair, used, or discontinue 
hearings for noncontroversial people.138 Much tradition and some recent 
practice suggest distinguished nominees who lack controversy merit hearings 
and ballots, yet ideological criticisms protracted selection. 139 
Nonetheless, the floor was the bottleneck. Restricted debates and votes 
explain the minuscule number of confirmations. Reid might propel action 
by initiating nominee consideration more swiftly following panel approval. 
The senator expeditiously pursued numerous debates and ballots regarding 
circuit aspirants; however, McConnell often directly rejected the importun-
ing, essentially imposing filibusters. To the extent controversy which involves 
nominees means they languish across significant periods, Democrats should 
confine regular filibuster deployment by encouraging additional prompt rig-
orous chamber debates. 140 
136 Goodwin Liu Hearing, supra note 40; Lee Ross, Second Senate Hearing for Professor 
Liu, FoXNEWS.COM (Mar. 2, 2011), http://politics.blogs.foxnews.com/2011/03/02/senate-
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ARK. L. REv. 217, 305 (2012); Tobias, supra note 9, at 766, 774-75. 
139 See Tobias, supra note 9, at 764-65, 774-75. See generally Michael]. Gerhardt, Merit 
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Accordingly, the GOP needs to cooperate. It must jettison stalling perti-
nent floor activity on capable uncontroversial nominees. McConnell should 
enter greater numbers of ballot agreements while correspondingly request-
ing less debate time and many fewer roll call votes when individuals present 
strong profiles and do not engender controversy. If McConnell actually 
keeps remaining adamant, as evidenced by his June decision effectuating the 
Thurmond Rule, Democrats could hold the party accountable. Leahy cham-
pioned the viewpoints that all nominees whom the committee unanimously 
reports deserve immediate floor ballots while others approved have robust 
debates comparatively soon, but these rather ambitious concepts appear 
unrealistic, especially given the modern chamber's poisonous straits. 141 
Democrats have properly applied conciliatory approaches, notably 
meaningful consultation with Republicans and the nomination of choices 
whom the minority favors, yet it did reciprocate less than was appropriate. 
Should the GOP persistently depend on confrontational alternatives which 
slow talented noncontroversial candidates, perpetuating the seventeenjudge-
ship opening rate, Democrats may aggressively employ cloture and institute 
related solutions. They could also contemplate drastic alterations, namely 
revamping procedures, specifically the 2011 determination which changed 
anonymous holds or the chief executive's recent proposition that urged mer-
its votes ninety days after making choices.142 Insofar as limited confirmations 
suggest partisan efforts to undercut tlie White House or retribution for 
quickly appointing the Supreme Court nominees and Democrats' rejection 
of Bush possibilities, the majority should consider adoption of certain tools 
ton's filibuster failed but Liu's and Halligan's succeeded. Id.; 157 CoNG. REc. S3144 (daily 
ed. May 19, 2011); id. at S8346 (daily ed. Dec. 6, 2011); see Maura Dolan, Goodwin Liu 
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like the assertive concrete notions previously assessed, which the executive 
could apply. 
In the end, senators must precisely calibrate the necessity for thorough 
scrutiny with promptly addressing the multitude of crucial appellate court 
vacancies and confirm impressive nominees. Democrats and Republicans 
can fruitfully question whether each might overemphasize ideology, just as 
both should have concomitantly eschewed the quixotic venture to ascertain if 
earlier nominees could be "judicial activists."143 The parties correspondingly 
assume that the other derailed multiple Clinton and Bush nominees' circuit 
appointments by routinely criticizing ideologies which designees held.144 
Article H's wording seemingly contemplates that politicians may review abili-
ties, character, and temperament, 145 but the phraseology does not counte-
nance stalling premised on how selections might resolve appeals because this 
erodes judicial independence.146 Negligible disagreements with perspectives 
expressed through several cases or articles must infrequently eliminate indi-
viduals, views which numerous legislators have carefully espoused.147 ACLU 
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participation and lawyering may rarely be considered disqualifiers, just as 
Federalist Society involvement curtailed few Bush aspirants' confirmation 
and nomination. 148 One constructive antidote for these complications might 
be a presumption that skilled uncontroversial picks receive speedy approval 
or expeditious yes or no confirmation votes. 149 
CONCLUSION 
Appellate court vacancies undermine the delivery of justice. President 
Obama has implemented special endeavors to reduce partisan gridlock and 
stanch politicization with much vibrant consultation and the submission of 
competent diverse nominees, yet appointments have progressed less rapidly 
than is optimal. He should comprehensively examine and institute effica-
cious processes for hastening designee confirmation, while Republicans and 
Democrats must thoroughly cooperate with Obama and colleagues in seating 
judges. Each party needs to remember that it has fueled, and must concomi-
tantly abandon, the counterproductive dynamics for the good of the appeals 
courts and the country.1so 
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